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Abstract 
US health care costs are among the highest of all industrialized nations. In an 
effort to reduce costs and improve health outcomes, new delivery models – 
including accountable care organizations – have been developed. Yet, as revealed 
through interviews with key participants in Hennepin County's delivery project, 
significant challenges to implementing them exist.  They include obstacles that 
inherently arise from implementing a means-tested health care policy within a 
competitive, federalized governing structure.  Because these challenges are not 
unique to Hennepin County, this project can help similar projects and may push 
policy towards the integration of the health care and social service systems. 
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Introduction 
US health care costs are among the highest of all industrialized nations 
and for the last several years, they have been on the rise, out-pacing inflation and 
annual income growth. According to the Kaiser Family Foundation, 
“Expenditures in the United States on health care surpassed $2.3 trillion in 2008, 
more than three times the $714 billion spent in 1990, and over eight times the 
$253 billion spent in 1980.”1 Despite these expenditures, the US health system 
underperforms most other developed countries, and the US ranks last in nearly all 
measures of health care equity. Furthermore, those with the most need – those 
with characteristics of poverty, chronic illness, and/or addiction – are the least 
likely to receive good quality care and the most likely to pay inequitably for the 
care they do receive. Ultimately, this drives up the cost of the whole system since 
these populations cannot access preventative care, get sick and then seek 
treatment through the emergency department and/or are hospitalized – the most 
expensive real estate in health care services. 
 Two problems exist at the core of the US health care value problem. First, 
there are high levels of fragmentation within the system, and second, 
inappropriate financial incentives for providers are to blame for the relatively low 
health care value. Providers include primary care physicians, specialists, 
hospitals, lab technicians, surgeons, therapists and many more kinds, who – for 
the majority of patients – do not communicate and coordinate with each other. For 
example, if you have an appointment with your cardiologist and then go see your 
                                                
1 “U.S. Health Care Costs: Background Brief.” kaiserEDU.org. The Kaiser Family 
Foundation, Last accessed April 16, 2012. http://www.kaiseredu.org/Issue-
Modules/US-Health-Care-Costs/Background-Brief.aspx. 
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primary care physician, your primary care physician has no idea what your 
cardiologist recommended and vice versa. Then you as the patient are left trying 
to explain what each of the providers did and recommended to the other 
providers. In other words, most providers do not coordinate care with the patient 
at the center of care. In a few places, however, patient-centered medical home 
models have been implemented in an effort to better integrate health care services. 
These models are coordinated care models that incorporate such principles as 
whole-person orientation, increased access, and improved quality and safety. But, 
patient-centered medical home models were not enough as they focused on 
primary care and not the entire health care system.  
As such, accountability has now been purposely introduced into the US 
health care system through demonstration projects. The principles and goals of 
medical home models have been subsumed as the foundation of new, larger and 
more varied integrated health delivery system reforms, which incorporate the key 
concept of accountability. Accountable care organization (ACO) is the term 
currently used to describe a health care delivery system that seeks to reduce health 
care costs while improving health care outcomes for targeted populations through 
reformed payment methods, coordinated care models (including those adopted 
from the medical home philosophy), and health information technology. The 
accountability piece attempts to make providers more responsible for their 
patients’ health outcomes by changing payment methods to reward quality of 
services over quantity. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act – the 
United States federal health care reform of 2010 – includes policy concerning 
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both medical home and ACO models. In the end though, both medical homes and 
ACOs are highly complex care models with unclear and frequently disputed 
definitions, making them difficult to implement.  
Examining medical home and ACO models and their implementation, this 
study has a dual purpose. First, this study seeks to answer questions of 
implementation concerning integrated health care delivery system models, 
particularly ACO or ACO-like models: What are the challenges of 
implementation that these new reform models face? Will these challenges inhibit 
successful implementation? And second, policy implementation literature has yet 
to find a universal framework that can either adequately describe the various 
factors that affect implementation or predict the successful implementation of a 
policy. This study therefore uses its examination of complex health care policy to 
compare and scrutinize two models of policy implementation – Sabatier & 
Mazmanian’s conceptual framework to policy implementation and Majone & 
Wildavsky’s implementation as evolution model.  
Using a case study of one integrated health care delivery system 
demonstration project, this study combines content analysis of reports and statutes 
with semi-structured, in-depth interviews. The case study is of Hennepin Health, a 
demonstration project in the largest county in Minnesota, and the interview 
participants are key actors involved in the process of developing and 
implementing the Hennepin Health demonstration project. Hennepin Health is a 
unique model and case study because it is a health system reform led by a county 
government and incorporates social services as part of the model. This project 
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explains the common challenges that any integrated health care delivery system 
reform in the US faces, demonstrating the significant barriers that exist for 
successful implementation. Because of the evolution of policy, the experience 
from former projects and the identification of possible solutions to the articulated 
barriers by participants, Hennepin Health will most likely be successful in 
improving health outcomes and at least controlling health care costs for its 
targeted population. Regardless of its success, though, Hennepin Health has 
strong implications for local, state and federal policy for more intimately 
integrated health care and social service systems. And as for the second part of the 
research question, this case study points out the inadequacies of both policy 
implementation models, showing how their complexity inhibits their use and that 
both are incapable of predicting successful implementation. 
In the end, Hennepin Health is a case study that exhibits the need for 
political scientists to develop more predictive, rather than just descriptive, policy 
implementation models. If a better way to identify factors that affect successful 
implementation could be used to correct those issues during policy creation or the 
early stages of implementation, more policies – including the implementation of 
Hennepin Health – could be implemented successfully. As for this case study’s 
role in health care and social service policy, if successful for their objectives, 
Hennepin Health has the potential to transform America’s fragmented health care 
and social service delivery model.  
To exhibit these findings, the paper follows accordingly. The first section 
examines policy implementation theory, giving brief overviews of Lipsky’s street-
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level bureaucracy theory and Sabatier & Mazmanian’s, as well as Majone & 
Wildavsky’s, models. The section ends with a short comparison of the last two 
models. The next section covers literature concerning medical home models and 
ACOs. Giving definitions for ACOs, and medical home models as the 
foundational care models to ACOs, along with the history and development of 
these models, sets up the potential challenges these reforms face. The second 
section also covers payment models, legislation that contains ACOs, and the 
importance of reform success. A short methodological statement is the third 
section, explaining the interview process. And finally, the fourth section includes 
this study’s analysis, implications and limitations. It describes in detail the 
Hennepin Health project and its difference from typical ACOs. Then, the 
challenges to implementing the project are outlined under four categories: 
governance, means-tested programs, US health care and program evaluation. 
Following is a comparison of the two policy implementation models in relation to 
Hennepin Health. This final section ends with implications for future 
implementation research and future US health care and social policy, as well as a 
delineation of this study’s limitations. 
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Policy Implementation Literature 
 
 Researchers study implementation and attempt to develop policy 
implementation models to find out what makes a policy and its subsequent 
implementation successful, but also to eventually predict implementation success. 
Being able to predict what makes implementation successful should help policy-
makers address social problems through better policies and regulations, as well as 
anticipate and plan for likely barriers. It is the predictive quality of a model that is 
important for this project, with the goal being to extrapolate what influences the 
success of implementation and to generalize that to the implementation of health 
care and social policy.  
In the late 1970s, Michael Lipsky’s street-level bureaucracy theory forced 
political scientists to take a more serious consideration of what happens to policy 
after it has been created and the role of individuals employed by the government 
to carry out implementation. Since that push, much literature has been produced 
concerning policy implementation. However, due to the inherently complex 
nature of implementation, researchers within this area have found little to agree 
on and moreover, have few conclusive theories on how implementation actually 
occurs. In fact, the more intricate and convoluted policy is – like health care 
policy – the more difficult it is to neatly fit an implementation model to it. 
Looking across the literature though, authors have found a few similar ways to 
discuss policy implementation. Some have examined it with a more linear 
approach, which typically involves a discussion of top-down versus bottom-up 
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approaches, or a combination there of.1 Sabatier & Mazmanian provide the most 
referenced and comprehensive linear framework for policy implementation with 
the presentation of five stages of implementation. Another pair of prominent 
authors within the field of implementation study has taken a more holistic 
approach to the study of implementation. Majone & Wildavsky’s model focuses 
on the evolutionary tendencies of policy creation and implementation.  
The following sections provide a short synopsis of Lipsky’s contributions 
to implementation research, as well as more detailed examinations of Sabatier & 
Mazmanian’s implementation framework and Majone & Wildavsky’s models of 
implementation. Succeeding is a comparison and critique of the two pairs’ work. 
And finally, within this section’s conclusion is a look at the importance of 
studying implementation models, particularly the two models referenced here. 
                                                
1 In chapter eight, “Policy Implementation and Policy Failure” of his book An 
Introduction to the Policy Process, Thomas Birkland lays out three approaches to 
implementation: top-down, bottom-up, and a combined approach. In the first 
approach, Birkland explains that implementation is viewed as being a chain, 
beginning with a policy message being sent from the top and then followed down the 
chain (p. 179). The top-down approach assumes that the policy contains clearly 
defined goals and policy tools and is characterized by an authoritative statement, and 
that “policy designers have good knowledge of the capacity and commitment of the 
implementers” (p. 179). According to Birkland, this model ultimately fails due to the 
following obstacles: a lack of consensus about goals; lack of cooperation or a refusal 
to implement at state and local levels; competing interests; and insufficient 
incentives and/or sanctions for compliance (pp. 179-181). In opposition to the top-
down approach, Birkland describes a bottom-up approach, which relies heavily on 
the idea of backward mapping: examining those on the street-level who implement 
the policy and then go up the policy chain (p. 182). This approach assumes that goals 
are ambitious (and not explicit) and sometimes in conflict with existing policies, 
local level implementers are allowed a great deal of bargaining during the 
implementation process, and the policy ultimately works through a network of actors 
(pp. 182-183). Some shortcomings include: overemphasis on local level power, 
negating a potential lack of resources, and an assumption that groups are active in 
participation (p. 183). To overcome the failures of both of these models, Birkland 
concludes that the synthesis of these models, which he refers to as “A Third 
Generation of Implementation Research,” is the best model for describing 
implementation processes (p. 184). This combined method sees implementation as a 
process of negotiation and communication; the idea of sending messages between 
being key to implementation success. 
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Lipsky 
The bottom-up approach originates from the work of Michael Lipsky 
(1980) and his description of how ‘street-level bureaucrats’ implement policies 
mandated from above. Lipsky coined the term ‘street-level bureaucrats’ in his 
book Street-level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services 
published in 1980. Lipsky made a compelling case for the role and power that 
street-level bureaucrats exert in policy implementation. Within his model, Lipsky 
defines street-level bureaucrats as “public service workers who interact directly 
with citizens in the course of their jobs, and who have substantial discretion in the 
execution of their work.”2 This includes police officers, teachers, principals, 
public health workers, public lawyers, court officers, social workers, and many 
other public employees. From Lipsky’s point of view, street-level bureaucrats 
hold all the power in determining policy goals and the success of these goals 
because of their individual discretion in enforcing, partially enforcing, or ignoring 
policies put forth from the legislature and from high-level bureaucrats. The 
actions that street-level bureaucrats take make up the services delivered by the 
government. Most people encounter government through these services – and in 
fact most people solely encounter government in this manner. Therefore, 
government, as distributed by street-level bureaucrats, is the only government that 
these people know. This places a significant amount of power in the hands of 
street-level bureaucrats.  
                                                
2 Lipsky, Michael. Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public 
Services. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1980, p. 3. 
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Critics of the street-level bureaucracy model argue that Lipsky gives too 
much power to public service workers, but agree that these same workers play 
some role in policy decisions and do not simply implement decisions made by 
elected officials.3 Street-level bureaucrats may be able to delay implementation 
but not avoid it, typically due to a lack of resources.4 Despite the critiques, many 
researchers have incorporated Lipsky’s basic idea about the role that street-level 
bureaucrats – those who in reality act out or implement policies – into their own 
models by giving some thought, and even some power, to street-level 
bureaucrats.5  
As the genesis of formal policy implementation research, Lipsky’s 
research is foundational to any exploration of implementation theory, but as will 
be seen from the following models, more recent implementation theory discredits 
the idea that implementation is unidirectional. No longer do researchers believe 
that policy-makers write legislation, rules and regulation, and it is enacted exactly 
by letter or in the manner of its intention. Nor do researchers believe, like Lipsky 
claimed, that street-level bureaucrats are in complete control of the 
implementation process. Instead, researchers give credit to both the top – the 
policy-creators, and the bottom – local agents who work at the general public 
level. 
 
                                                
3 Evans, Tony and John Harris. “Street-Level Bureaucracy, Social Work and the 
(Exaggerated) Death of Discretion.” British Journal of Social Work 34, no. 6 (2004). 
4 Birkland, Thomas A. An Introduction to the Policy Process: Theories, Concepts, and 
Models of Public Policy Making. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2001, p. 184. 
5 Maynard-Moody, Steven and Michael Musheno. Cops, Teachers, Counselors: Stories 
from the Front Lines of Public Service. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2003. 
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Sabatier & Mazmanian 
Paul Sabatier and Daniel Mazmanian have thus far put forth one of the 
most comprehensive frameworks for policy implementation, giving insight into 
the process. In “A Conceptual Framework of the Implementation Process” (1980), 
Sabatier & Mazmanian lay out a two-part framework for analyzing policy 
implementation. First, they assess the characteristics of the policy, actors and 
systems involved; these characteristics are sorted under three categories: 1) 
tractability of the problem, 2) the ability of the statute to structure 
implementation, and 3) the nonstatutory variables affecting implementation.6 The 
tractability of the problem is tied to behavioral change. Understanding the 
behavior, its variance, the percentage of the population exhibiting a particular 
behavior, and the amount of behavior change required are all parts of tractability.7 
By highlighting tractability as one of the three categories of characteristics that 
shape implementation, Sabatier & Mazmanian enrich research surrounding policy 
implementation by forcing political scientists to examine the process as even 
beginning prior to the creation of policy. Instead, the authors infer, research 
should begin with an examination of how the characteristics of the problem 
(behaviors necessary to change) can play a role in implementation success or 
failure. The model predicts more difficult, or less tractable, societal problems and 
behaviors are going to have lower rates of implementation success. 
The category of structuring implementation within statutes is the area in 
which the problem and its parts are linked to the ways in which policy-creators 
                                                
6 Theodoulou, Stella Z. and Matthew Alan Cahn.  Public Policy: The Essential Readings. 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1995, p. 154. 
7 Ibid., pp. 154-157. 
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choose to address them. Through the policy, creators decide not only the goals of 
a policy but also how to reach those goals; they must formulate the policy with a 
view of execution.8 Such a policy characteristic focuses on the role that policy-
creators have in the implementation process. The first part of structuring 
implementation begins with clearly defining the problem and then stating clear, 
explicit, precise, measurable and realizable objectives that are ranked in 
importance.9  
Next, structuring implementation involves incorporating a valid causal 
relationship, which is not only highly emphasized throughout this framework, but 
is also seen within other authors’ work.10 The structuring of policy must follow a 
means-end theory in which the final results are “genetically related” to the 
original policy idea.11 In other words, the policy clearly states not only how to 
complete the objectives, but also how the objectives fix the problem. 
Resources are the next important feature to consider when structuring 
implementation. Sabatier & Mazmanian stress the importance of having adequate 
financial resources available during the implementation process, but other authors 
add resources such as expertise of the subject,12 healthy state and local 
                                                
8 Theodoulou and Cahn, Public Policy: The Essential Readings.  
9 Weissert and Weissert, Birkland, Majone, and Gerston all agree with Sabatier & 
Mazmanian in this regard, and Birkland ties a lack of consensus about goals and 
competing or conflicting goals to an opportunity for street-level bureaucracy to play 
a larger role in implementation. And as Gerston writes, “…complete coordination of 
competing objectives into compatible goals can bring on implementation failure,” if 
failure is defined as street-level bureaucracy not implementing policy as directed or 
not fulfilling the policy-creators’ objectives (p. 114). 
10 Birkland, An Introduction to the Policy Process: Theories, Concepts, and Models of 
Public Policy Making. 
11 Theodoulou and Cahn, Public Policy: The Essential Readings, pp. 140-153. 
12 Ibid., pp. 140-153; Weissert, Carol S. and William G. Weissert. Governing Health: The 
Politics of Health Policy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006. 
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economies,13 implementers’ capacity and commitment,14 technology, and political 
and legal resources.15 These resources are important in order to entice both 
implementers and target groups to comply with policy rules, to monitor 
compliance and to ensure understanding of both policy objectives and design. In 
order to properly structure implementation, a policy must also contain incentives 
for compliance, sanctions for non-compliance or a combination of both.16 All 
authors describe these control techniques using different words or phrases, and 
Sabatier & Mazmanian choose to focus on the idea of compliance. They break 
down the concept of compliance into four parts: target group attitudes about 
legitimacy of rules; sanctions available to penalize noncompliance; the costs to 
target groups of compliance; and the probability that noncompliance will be 
detected and/or prosecuted. All policy needs to be structured with these parts of 
compliance in mind in order to be successful. 
The final pieces of structured implementation are the number of veto or 
clearance points involved in enforcement actions, the assignment of 
implementation to sympathetic agencies and officials,17 inter-agency relationships 
and hierarchy,18 the number of people and agencies involved,19 and the new 
policy’s relationship to previous and/or existing policies.20 
                                                
13 Anderson, James E. Public Policymaking an Introduction. Boston, MA: Cengage, 
2011. 
14 Birkland, An Introduction to the Policy Process: Theories, Concepts, and Models of 
Public Policy Making, p. 179; Theodoulou and Cahn, Public Policy: The Essential 
Readings. 
15 Theodoulou and Cahn, Public Policy: The Essential Readings. 
16 Anderson calls the combination of the two “control techniques.” (Anderson, Public 
Policymaking an Introduction, pp. 242-243) 
17 Theodoulou and Cahn, Public Policy: The Essential Readings. 
18 Weissert and Weissert, Governing Health: The Politics of Health Policy. 
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Many of the variables that impact implementation can be regulated 
through a well-written policy, but there are still variables and characteristics of 
the implementation process that operate outside of the policy and its stipulations. 
Sabatier & Mazmanian refer to these as nonstatutory variables, which includes 
variations of the following: media attention, public support, political support, 
resources, and attitudes, skill and commitment of implementing agencies and 
officials. While these are all important in determining if a policy can be or is 
being implemented successfully, a few variables that fall under this category 
deserve emphasis. First, Birkland describes policy learning as a characteristic that 
impacts implementation.21 This type of learning is when policy-creators learn how 
to both better structure policies and how to better advocate for policies. Policy 
learning also includes when political institutions (including governmental 
agencies) learn how to either better implement or better avoid implementation. 
The second variable that deserves special attention is the impact that time and 
changes in social, economic, political and technological conditions have in the 
attainability of objectives.22 Time and its relationship with change are significant 
to implementation. The concept of change makes defining successful 
implementation and predicting implementation success difficult as policy – and 
subsequently its implementation – is constantly evolving for its own benefit. 
                                                                                                         
19 Ibid.; Gerston, Larry N. Public Policy Making: Process and Principles. Armonk, N.Y.: 
M.E. Sharpe, 2004. 
20 Birkland, An Introduction to the Policy Process: Theories, Concepts, and Models of 
Public Policy Making. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid.; Theodoulou and Cahn, Public Policy: The Essential Readings, pp. 153-172. 
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Therefore change over time is a vital part of the implementation process and one 
that researchers need to better evaluate. 
The third and final variable to add to Sabatier & Mazmanian’s list of 
nonstatutory variables is bargaining and the role of street-level bureaucrats in 
determining implementation. Most researchers emphasize the importance of 
bargaining, negotiation, communication and political maneuvering in 
implementation. Policy truly works through a network of actors, and the 
bargaining that occurs after a policy is written is just as important as the intentions 
and objectives of the policy-creators.23 Bargaining highlights the role that street-
level bureaucrats, as described by Lipsky, play in the implementation process. 
Following the details of how each of these characteristics play into 
implementation success, Sabatier & Mazmanian break down the process of 
implementation into five stages: “(1) the policy outputs (decisions) of the 
implementing agencies; (2) the compliance of target groups with those decisions; 
(3) the actual impacts of the agency decisions; (4) the perceived impacts of those 
decisions; and finally, (5) the political system’s evaluation of a statute in terms of 
major revisions (or attempted revisions) in its content.”24 These five stages have a 
loose linear progression, although Sabatier & Mazmanian place no time 
restrictions on the completion of any of the stages. In the first stage, agencies 
create policies and regulations from statutory objectives. This is the first place for 
slippage between statute objectives and implementation. The second stage is the 
target group’s decision to comply with the implementing agency’s regulations. 
                                                
23 Birkland, An Introduction to the Policy Process: Theories, Concepts, and Models of 
Public Policy Making. 
24 Theodoulou and Cahn, Public Policy: The Essential Readings, p. 167. 
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Within this stage, sanctions or incentive that promote compliance are important. 
Actual compliance with policy and its objectives is the third stage, followed 
closely by the perception of impact by “constituency groups and sovereigns in the 
policy subsystem” as the fourth stage.25 And finally, feedback and revision round 
out the implementation process. Sabatier & Mazmanian recognize the inevitability 
of revision for policies post initial implementation.26 At the end of these stages, 
the process begins again with the revised policy. 
Majone & Wildavsky 
In their article, “Implementation as Evolution” (1973), Giandomencio 
Majone and Aaron Wildavsky put forth three models of implementation: 
implementation as control, implementation as interaction, and implementation as 
evolution, eventually advocating for the last model as the most accurate. First, 
looking at the implementation as control model, this model is similar to the top-
down ideas from other authors. The initial plan and its realization are on the same 
logical level, becoming a means-end theory with policy creators directing and 
agencies following set instructions in a rational manner.27 Such a model is similar 
to ideas about a top-down approach where the policy has clear goals and a 
detailed plan as to how to reach those goals. Furthermore, the implementation as 
control model encompasses many of the techniques of control and compliance 
measures that another researcher later describes in his work.28 Yet this model 
fails, Majone & Wildavsky argue, because it is “too clean” and leaves out the 
                                                
25 Ibid., p. 170. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., p. 141. 
28 Anderson, Public Policymaking an Introduction. 
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intricacies of real life: “…it leaves out the detours, the blind alleys, the discarded 
hypotheses, the constraints tightened and loosened, the lumpy stuff of life in favor 
of a predigested formula.”29 The overall failures of the implementation as control 
model are summed up to what we all know about reality: there are few black and 
white situations – most involve some gray area. 
To then incorporate street-level bureaucracy in the mix, the 
implementation as interaction model emphasizes communication through 
consensus, bargaining, and political maneuvering. The focus of this model is a 
goal and process dichotomy, which implies that implementation success or failure 
is divorced from policy success or failure. Implementation is its own reward 
because the process is the purpose, not the goals set forth by clear policy. 
Ultimately, the outcomes of policy cannot be predictable because implementation 
is the result of the interaction of many participants and not solely the policy-
creators’ or the implementers’ actions or intentions. In the end, Majone & 
Wildavsky state that this model, like the implementation as control model, fails to 
describe the implementation process because it is inadequate for assessing the 
worth of policy ideas. It places the quality of policy ideas on the same level as the 
social forces that are capturing and corrupting the process. 
Finally, Majone & Wildavsky build the case for their third model, 
implementation as evolution. The authors state that all policy plans are 
potentialities, and their realization depends on both the intrinsic qualities of the 
policy and external circumstances. The authors view multiplicity, the balance of 
objectives and constraints, as the most important factor in implementation. Ideas 
                                                
29 Theodoulou and Cahn, Public Policy: The Essential Readings, p. 141. 
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shape policy and its objectives, but these are constantly evolving to conform to 
new situations or to address new problems. Policy-creators frequently alter 
objectives due to resources available or find the resources to meet their old 
objectives. And most importantly, “We choose after the act as well as 
before…Indeed, old patterns of behavior are often retrospectively rationalized to 
fit new notions about appropriate objectives.”30 The implementation as evolution 
model allows for not only a strong policy to direct implementation and for the 
interaction that occurs between the top and the bottom, but also for the changing 
of ideas and circumstances in an endless evolution process. The final results of 
implementation are always “genetically related” to the original policy idea, but 
solutions change as problems are re-framed and reformulated.  
A Comparison and Critique of the Two Models 
The most significant difference between the two models – Sabatier & 
Mazmanian and Majone & Wildavsky – is that the first model presents a more 
linear projection with five phases while the latter presents a more holistic view on 
implementation. Although both sets of authors allow for communication between 
the policy creators and policy implementers, Majone & Wildavsky center their 
model on the concept of ever-present change and adaption, making a clear 
distinction between the second model they described – implementation as 
interaction – and the model of implementation as evolution. The role of 
communication is secondary to the role of change in their model. Sabatier & 
Mazmanian, on the other hand, do not give communication or change, or any 
other of the characteristics that they describe, precedence over the other 
                                                
30 Theodoulou and Cahn, Public Policy: The Essential Readings, pp. 146-147. 
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characteristics. Change in policy-makers’, agencies’ and society’s attitudes have 
equal weight with problem tractability and communication through policy 
structuring. Furthermore, Sabatier & Mazmanian provide a step-by-step, frame-
by-frame view of implementation through the description of five stages. 
Conversely, when examining implementation through Majone & Wildavsky’s 
model, snap shots of implementation can be taken at any point in time, but within 
each of these snap shots, all the components that affect implementation will be 
present – with each snap shot being a unique combination of these components.  
Despite this difference in the essence of the two models, both models have 
one important similarity: they acknowledge that at any point implementation is 
never complete. Majone & Wildavsky do this through the idea of evolution and 
change; similar to any organism in nature, the process of evolution is never 
complete. Sabatier & Mazmanian give space to this same idea by ending their set 
of stages with policy evaluation and revision. In a sense, they are making the 
claim that policy creation and implementation is never complete because it must 
always come back to the stage of evaluation and revision. In conclusion, Sabatier 
& Mazmanian have a linear projection for implementation while Majone & 
Wildavsky take on a more holistic analysis, but both concede that implementation 
is a constant process. 
However, both models have their own faults. Sabatier & Mazmanian’s 
framework for implementation, while delineated by characteristics and neatly 
placed into five stages, is still a highly complex and overwhelming model. Many 
of the characteristics overlap or at least impact each other, and since 
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implementation in a continuous process, distinguishing the separate stages is 
difficult. Therefore, while the framework is comprehensive from a research 
standpoint, it may also be too comprehensive to realistically use in examining the 
implementation of a policy. Its functionality, which is its ability to predict 
whether implementation will be successful or not, is limited by the sheer 
complexity of the model.  
Majone & Wildavsky’s fault lies within the very axis of their model: its 
dependence on change and the inability to pinpoint the factors that impact 
implementation. By relying so heavily on the idea of change and evolution, the 
authors unfairly undermine the factors and patterns within implementation that 
have already been identified as affecting implementation and its success. While it 
is true that researchers struggle to exactly forecast implementation outcomes, 
particularly due to the role of evolution, there are incentives, sanctions, techniques 
of control, and other factors – many of which have already been identified in 
research – that predictably play significant roles in the implementation process. 
 In the end, the two models’ greatest assets when placed against one 
another are paradoxically also the two models’ greatest failures. First, Sabatier & 
Mazmanian outline many variables that may influence implementation, giving 
individuals involved in policy-making and implementation insight into what will 
potentially affect implementation. Majone & Wildavsky’s greatest quality is their 
holistic approach, being able to see the big picture. As for the models’ 
insufficiencies, Sabatier & Mazmanian’s model is not robust enough. It outlines 
in great detail the many characteristics that could impact implementation, but by 
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not ranking these characteristics in terms of which have the most effect, the 
authors leave policy-creators and implementers guessing as to which 
characteristics to prioritize and address. On the other hand, Majone & Wildavsky 
take too general of an approach, giving no specific characteristics and no direction 
within their model.  
However, simply combining the two models is not sufficient. Neither of 
the models is predictive – and therefore has limited functionality – and even if 
used in conjunction, the conjoined model would fail to predict implementation 
success. The models can be applied post-hoc to describe implementation success 
or failure, but neither predicts implementation success to assist in structuring 
policy for that success. Such limitations of these implementation models are 
demonstrated later with the case study of Hennepin Health. 
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Literature Concerning ACOs and Medical Homes 
Accountable care organizations – once described as the unicorn of health 
care, something that was imagined in all its fullness but never actually seen – are 
now tangible and significant health care models, which have the potential to 
substantially reform the US health care system. In fact, Crosson argues that the 
ACO model is too important to fail, claiming that the alternative to not 
fundamentally changing the United States’ current health care system is “likely to 
be a type of indiscriminate cost cutting that will leave the nation with a damaged 
health care system, reduced access to care services, and declining quality of 
care.”1 The challenges to implementing ACOs and similar models shadow the 
importance that Crosson and others have placed on the successful implementation 
of ACOs within the health care system – or at least the successful implementation 
of a health care delivery and payment overhaul. Within this paper, the modified 
ACO model that Hennepin County has adopted acts as a case study for questions 
concerning health care policy implementation in general, as well as specific to 
delivery system reform success. To better understand Hennepin County’s new 
project though, some background information on ACOs is important, including 
the evolution of the ACO model, how the medical home care model fits as a 
foundation to ACOs, the payment reforms required as part of an ACO, why it is 
so vital for ACO models to succeed, and ACOs’ current role in legislation. Such 
information provides necessary depth to understanding ACO and medical home 
                                                
1 Crosson, Francis J. “The Accountable Care Organization: Whatever its Growing Pains, 
the Concept is Too Vitally Important to Fail.” Health Affairs 30, no. 7 (2011): 1250-
1255, p. 1250. 
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models in order to fully appreciate the significance of their implementation 
challenges. 
The history of ACOs developed from coordinated care concepts, which 
emerged in the late 1960s, through the periods of HMOs and managed care in the 
1990s and early 2000s to the demonstration projects that, in recent years, have 
shaped the broad and flexible definition of ACOs. But what truly brought about 
ACOs’ emergence was the combination of the evolution of key primary care 
concepts – particularly medical home2 models – and the dire need for payment 
and incentive reforms within the US health care system. In order to better 
understand the ideals and core concepts of ACOs, how ACOs differ from 
previous system models, and ultimately, what ACOs might mean for our current 
health care system, it is essential to know the history and theory of medical home 
models and two prominent payment methods: fee-for-service (FFS) and 
capitation. As such, this section will give a broad working definition for ACOs 
followed by more in-depth discussions of medical home models and payment 
methods and reform. The part involving medical home models will answer key 
questions, including what a medical home is, challenges to implementing medical 
homes, and potential for successful implementation of these care models. In the 
discussion concerning payment methods and reforms, a brief synopsis of what 
fee-for-service and capitation models are will be provided. And finally, this 
section will end with a discussion of the role that ACOs presently have within 
legislation and the model’s importance in overall health care reform.  
                                                
2 Throughout this paper, medical home will be an all-encompassing term for medical 
home, health home, and health care home models.  
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Accountable Care Organizations 
 ACOs were born from frustration with the misalignment of financial 
incentives and quality care delivery. As Mark McClellan – one of the two people 
responsible for coining the term – wrote:  
The notion of ACOs emerged in response to a growing consensus among 
the clinical and academic communities, including the Medicare Payment 
Advisory Commission and the Institute of Medicine, that shared 
accountability among providers could address the gaps in quality and 
unnecessary costs caused by fragmented and poorly coordinated care.3 
 
ACOs were therefore envisioned as a means to correct such incentive problems by 
providing enhanced financial compensation for activities that improve care 
quality, such as care coordination. These activities are not typically reimbursed 
through traditional fee-for-service and capitation models, meaning there is no 
financial incentive to provide care coordination and other similar services to 
patients.4 Furthermore, the Congressional Budget Office does not believe that 
there is sufficient evidence that health information technology, care coordination, 
and disease management alone reduce health care costs.5 Yet, as with any new 
design or model, ACOs face their own challenges of implementation. 
Definition of Accountable Care Organizations 
 There is no precise structure of an ACO as the definition of an ACO is 
flexible with a greater focus on the goals rather than precise structuring policies. 
ACOs are relatively new concepts in health care policy, and as defined by 
                                                
3 McClellan, Mark and Elliot Fisher. “Accountable Care Organizations: A Framework 
For Evaluating Proposed Rules.” Health Affairs (blog), March 31, 2011. 
4 Ibid.  
5 McClellan, Mark, Aaron N. McKethan, Julie L. Lewis, Joachin Roski, and Elliott S. 
Fisher. “A National Strategy to Put Accountable Care into Practice.” Health Affairs 
29, no. 5 (2010): 982-990, p. 985. 
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McClellan, “ACOs consist of providers who are jointly held accountable for 
achieving measured quality improvements and reductions in the rate of spending 
growth.”6 The two goals are simple: improve quality and lower costs. These are 
the same goals that the health care system has had for decades. ACOs must 
achieve overall, per capita improvements in quality and cost for a particular 
population.7 However, reaching those goals has clearly eluded health care policy 
makers and providers. The actual structure of an ACO involves the melding of 
medical home models that tackle care coordination and payment methods that 
better incentivize quality of care and improved health outcomes. The combination 
of medical home models and payment reform is a way to address both goals. But, 
like the two previously stated goals, marrying coordinated care delivery with 
payment that incentivizes quality over quantity is a formula that has been 
attempted and has not yet been successful on a broad scale in the US.  
An ACO is more than the simple melding of these two concepts though. In 
order to accomplish the goals of quality and cost reduction, the medical home 
model, as part of an ACO, must evolve into a medical neighborhood model.8 No 
longer can care coordination be isolated to primary care providers coordinating 
care with hospitals and specialists, bearing the entire financial and organizational 
burden. Instead, the whole network of providers now needs to share in the 
responsibility of patient care coordination and delivery. In the same vein, payment 
                                                
6 Ibid., p. 982. 
7 Ibid., p. 983. 
8 Nutting, Paul A., Benjamin F. Crabtree, William L. Miller, Kurt C. Stange, Elizabeth 
Stewart, and Carlos Jaen. “Transforming Physician Practices to Patient-Centered 
Medical Homes: Lessons from the National Demonstration Project.” Health Affairs 
30, no. 3 (2011): 439-445, p. 443. 
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methods cannot continue as is. Significant changes need to occur so that financial 
reimbursement better reflects the health outcomes desired. McClellan argues that 
ACOs therefore need to have a great deal of flexibility in aspects of design, 
allowing groups of providers the ability to try new and innovative approaches to 
delivery.9 Additionally, ACOs have one new over-arching theme compared to 
former reforms and models: the concept of accountability. Being part of the 
term’s name, accountability is the essential concept for the structure of a delivery 
system: 
The core idea of the ACO is that groups of providers – hospitals, 
physicians, some combination of both – will agree to be responsible for all 
of the medical care for a certain number of people, even for the care that 
they’re not directly providing. The responsibility – or to match the 
coinage, the accountability – is supposed to extend to both the cost and the 
quality of the care being delivered.10 
 
ACO structure allows for a variety of provider configurations, but ultimately all 
of these providers are accountable for a group of patients. They are responsible 
for the care provided, the cost of care and the patients’ health outcomes; they are 
even responsible for the patients when they seek care outside of the ACO’s 
provider configuration. This creates high incentive to make the patient experience 
so exceptional that patients do not seek care outside of the ACO. McClellan 
believes that a provider partnership with a hospital is favorable, but not necessary. 
Conversely, a strong base of primary care is necessary for an ACO to function 
successfully.11 
                                                
9 McClellan et al., “A National Strategy to Put Accountable Care into Practice,” p. 983. 
10 “Accountable Care Organizations.” Harvard Health Publications. Last modified 1 
April 2011. 
11 McClellan et al., “A National Strategy to Put Accountable Care into Practice,” p. 983. 
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 An ACO has six components: a people-centered foundation; a medical 
home; a high-value network; population health data management; ACO 
leadership; and payer partnership. The first core component demands that ACOs 
adopt a people-centered perspective, where a focus on patients’ “engagement, 
activation, [and] satisfaction” will drive better overall outcomes through high-
quality experiences.12 Next, the incorporation of a medical home model – which 
itself is a complex care coordination and delivery concept – is discussed later in 
this section. The third component, a high-value network, is a network of 
specialists and non-primary care providers that is highly integrated and 
coordinated with continual improvement.13 Fourth, the concept of population 
health data management refers to the information technology (IT) that is used 
within an ACO. Moving beyond what IT resources and tools were previously 
required to do, IT in an ACO is used to: 
…Collect data on individual health status; stratify and target populations 
based on their risk and need for care; engage people in their health using 
patient health records or online portal; connect to a health information 
exchange to ensure portability of records; and direct physicians toward 
appropriate, evidence-based care protocols.14 
 
High expectations have been placed on the evolution and use of health IT in ACO 
models. The fifth component, ACO leadership, encompasses the idea that 
sophisticated leadership from primary care physicians, specialists, hospitals and 
other providers with joint legal, financial, and medical management can overcome 
                                                
12 DeVore, Susan and R. Wesley Champion. “Driving Population Health through 
Accountable Care Organizations.” Health Affairs 30, no. 1 (2011): 41-50, p. 43. 
13 Ibid., p. 44. 
14 Ibid. 
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the current fragmentation in the health care system.15 The providers are not only 
accountable to their patients, but they are ultimately responsible to each other 
through shared risk and shared leadership. And finally, an ACO model requires 
payer partnership, including “predictive modeling, case management, network 
and medical management, and financial reporting” so that ACOs do not simply 
become another provider or insurance monopoly.16 Such monopolies in the past 
have locked patients into one system of care and inevitably driven up costs. These 
six components themselves are difficult concepts to pin down and implement 
within the health care system. As such, an ACO, which would encapsulate all six 
components, is a complicated model to put into practice and requires the 
flexibility that McClellan suggests to adapt to the needs of the populations being 
served and the providers involved. 
 When implementing an ACO, groups of providers need to have a 
comprehensive performance measurement. While measurement is not a necessary 
component for an ACO to function, it is necessary to demonstrate that cost 
savings are from improvement to care and not care cuts.17 Having comprehensive 
performance measurement will also aid in the testing of different ACO 
approaches in the hope of reproducing successful approaches in different regions 
and with various populations. However, having rigorous quality measures and 
being able to determine what savings and improved health resulted from 
preventive care is difficult. 
  
                                                
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 McClellan et al., “A National Strategy to Put Accountable Care into Practice,” p. 986. 
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How an ACO differs from HMOs and managed care plans 
 ACOs differ from health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and other 
managed care plans in some significant ways. HMOs and other managed care 
plans have been in place since the 1970s when the federal government passed the 
Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973. An HMO is a managed care 
insurance plan where the HMO contracts with primary care providers and 
specialists to create a network of providers for patients. Primary care providers act 
as gatekeepers to seeing specialists; only through a referral from a primary care 
physician can patients have their specialist visits covered by the HMO. Like an 
ACO though, HMOs and managed care plans come in a large variety of 
structures. Other similarities include the fact that patients are members of a 
provider network with a specific group of providers and that the providers are 
paid primarily per member rather than per procedure or test.18 However, the ways 
in which an ACO differs is important. First, ACOs do not turn provider groups 
into insurers.19 Second, in terms of the patients themselves, they will not be 
required to enroll in an ACO in order to receive services, and they are also not 
restricted to in-network or participating providers.20 There is no incentive for 
primary care physicians to act as gatekeepers because their patients are not 
required to see them first and patients’ care will be covered even if received out of 
network. As such, unlike other managed care plans, an ACO emphasizes shared 
                                                
18 Emanuel, Ezekiel and Jeffrey Liebman. “The End of Health Insurance Companies.” 
Opinionator: Exclusive Online Commentary from The Times. New York Times, 
January 30, 2012. 
19 McClellan and Fisher, “Accountable Care Organizations: A Framework For Evaluating 
Proposed Rules.” 
20 “Accountable Care Organizations.” 
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risk among providers with financial incentives for quality improvement rather 
than denial of care. ACOs are encouraged to invest in data collection and case 
managers because of the newly created financial incentives.21 And finally, HMOs 
and other managed care plans are typically national corporations, but ACOs are 
local health care provider groups, working together through partner leadership 
and shared risk.22 
Medical Homes 
  Medical home models are highly beneficial for patients in the manner in 
which care is coordinated, but since reform to primary care has not been enough, 
then there is a need to view medical homes as part of a whole system reform. 
With financial incentives remaining as is, there are concerns about primary care 
physicians’ ability to address budgetary concerns. “[A]nalysts have expressed 
concern that savings achieved through implementing medical homes may not 
reliably offset the costs of the medical home payments to the participating 
primary care providers on a long-term and sustainable basis.”23 Financial changes 
are needed to reimburse for coordinating services, to invest in necessary 
infrastructure, and to narrow the payment gap between primary care and specialty 
providers.24 Furthermore, within medical homes, patients are assigned to one 
provider, often based on their most recent visit; however, within an ACO – which 
is designed for shared responsibility, patients have a whole provider team.25 For 
                                                
21 Ibid. 
22 Emanuel and Liebman, “The End of Health Insurance Companies.” 
23 McClellan et al., “A National Strategy to Put Accountable Care into Practice,” p. 983. 
24 Landon, Bruce E., James M. Gill, Richard C. Antonelli, and Eugene C. Rich, 
“Prospects for Rebuilding Primary Care Using the Patient-Centered Medical Home.” 
Health Affairs 29, no. 5 (2010): 827-834, p. 832. 
25 McClellan et al., “A National Strategy to Put Accountable Care into Practice.” 
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these reasons, incorporating medical home models within the ACO design, 
reaping the benefits of coordinated care while ensuring a broader approach to 
properly incentivizing and reimbursing these services, is fundamental to reaching 
the goals of an ACO. And in order to properly understand the ACO model, it is 
important to grasp the concept of a medical home. 
Definition of a medical home model 
One group of authors broadly defines the patient-centered medical home 
as a “model of comprehensive health care delivery and payment reform that 
emphasizes the central role of primary care.”26 Another author writes, “A patient-
centered medical home is an enhanced model of primary care in which care 
teams, led by a primary care provider, attend to the multifaceted needs of patients 
and provide whole-person, comprehensive, coordinated, and patient-centered 
care.”27 The components of a medical home, depending on what source you 
reference, are: 
• a personal physician-patient relationship, 
• physician-directed, team-based medical practice, 
• whole-person orientation, 
• coordinated and integrated care, 
• ensured quality and safety, 
• improved access, information and communication for patients, 
• use of health information technology, 
• and payment reform.28 
                                                
26 Rittenhouse, Diane R., Lawrence P. Casalino, Robin R. Gillies, Stephen M. Shortell, 
and Bernard Lau. “Measuring the Medical Home Infrastructure in Large Medical 
Groups.” Health Affairs 27, no. 5 (2008): 1246-1258, pp. 1246-1247. 
27 Takach, Mary. “Reinventing Medicaid: State Innovations to Qualify and Pay for 
Patient-Centered Medical Homes show Promising Results.” Health Affairs 30, no. 7 
(2011): 1325-1334, p. 1325. 
28 Rittenhouse et al., “Measuring the Medical Home Infrastructure in Large Medical 
Groups,” p. 1247; Nutting et al., “Transforming Physician Practices to Patient-
Centered Medical Homes: Lessons from the National Demonstration Project,” p. 
440. 
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Ultimately though, there is no single, agreed-upon operational definition, set of 
components or required activities for a patient-centered medical home.29 The 
standards upon which providers are certified and then reimbursed for services also 
vary. Such wide variation of definitions and compensation policies has created a 
significant barrier to the universal implementation of medical homes.  
Challenges to implementation of medical homes 
Medical homes face challenges of qualification and financial barriers to 
scalability, unstable Medicaid populations, unrealistic expectations and change 
fatigue. Since medical homes are the foundation of ACOs, the challenges that 
medical home models face in implementation are transposed to ACOs. Having 
multiple sets of standards across the country presents challenges to practices that 
wish to receive financial compensation, particularly for Medicaid providers who 
are expected to meet both the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) 
and state-specific standards.30 Currently, most providers voluntarily become 
certified through standards established by the NCQA. The Center for Medical 
Home Improvement is another institution that evaluates the implementation of 
medical homes within practices, assessing them across six dimensions into a 
                                                
29 Reid, Robert J., Katie Coleman, Eric A. Johnson, Paul A. Fishman, Clarissa Hsu, Eric 
B. Larson, Michael P. Soman, Claire E. Trescott, and Michael Erikson. “The Group 
Health Medical Home at Year Two: Cost Savings, Higher Patient Satisfaction, and 
Less Burnout for Providers.” Health Affairs 29, no. 5 (2010): 835-843, p. 835. 
30 The Medicaid program is funded and operated jointly by the state and federal 
governments. As such, each state has its own Medicaid program regulations, but 
there are also national regulations. Providers are therefore required to follow both 
federal and state regulations in order to receive financial reimbursement for services 
performed for Medicaid patients. 
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series of attributes with four levels of performance.31 On top of these national sets 
of standards, individual states have modified NCQA standards or created their 
own for reimbursement of medical home services. Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New York and Pennsylvania have all modified the NCQA 
standards in an effort to “fill perceived gaps.”32 On the other hand, six states – 
including Minnesota – have created their own qualification standards.  
Now with federal regulations through the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act providing compensation and stipulations for health care 
home services for Medicare and Medicaid recipients, the guidelines that practices 
must follow are even further complicated. While the details are to be clarified 
through the regulatory process, the law currently indicates that “expanded access 
to care, comprehensive care management, coordinated and integrated care, 
appropriate use of information technology (IT), referral to community and social 
support services, and continuous quality improvement” will all be a part of the 
health homes’ definition.33 As Fields, et al. write, the complexity in criteria makes 
widespread standardization difficult:  
Practically speaking the complexity in the various guidelines and criteria 
may limit the number of physician practices that could implement a 
medical home successfully. Indeed, the Congressional Budget Office 
estimated in 2008 that only about 1 percent of medical practices at the 
time could meet the criteria for medical homes as defined in the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) demonstration criteria. This 
                                                
31 Fields, Daniel, Elizabeth Leshen, and Kavita Patel. “Driving Quality Gains and Cost 
Savings through Adoption of Medical Homes.” Health Affairs 29, no. 5 (2010): 819-
826, p. 820. 
32 Takach, “Reinventing Medicaid: State Innovations to Qualify and Pay for Patient-
Centered Medical Homes show Promising Results,” p. 1327. 
33 Abrams, Melinda, Edward L. Schor, and Stephen Schoenbaum. “How Physician 
Practices Could Share Personnel and Resources to Support Medical Homes.” Health 
Affairs 29, no. 6 (2010): 1194-1199, p. 1195. 
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complexity would make it more challenging to scale medical homes to 
make them the standard practice.34 
 
Multiple sets of standards is just one of the challenges that widespread 
medical home implementation faces. Practices, particularly small-sized 
practices,35 may struggle to meet the complex, comprehensive and costly 
requirements of installing and employing health information technology and 
obtaining the personnel and information needed to connect patients to necessary 
community services.36 In general, scalability is at least doubtful since few clinics 
thus far have been able to implement every aspect of the medical home model.37  
Endeavors to meet these costly standards will be particularly difficult if 
financial support is not available. As of current legislation, some researchers 
argue that financial incentives do not exist or are not strong enough to entice 
practices to make essential changes within primary care to include medical home 
services. Bielaszka-DuVernay contends that Medicare and Medicaid must make 
significant reforms to their reimbursement policies for the inclusion of medical 
home services.38 Rittenhouse, et al. agrees stating, “Changing the way in which 
primary care physicians are paid by aligning incentives to prepare and evaluate 
practices, to pay for the coordination and integration of care, and to reward higher 
                                                
34 Fields et al., “Driving Quality Gains and Cost Savings through Adoption of Medical 
Homes,” p. 822. 
35 Berenson, Robert A., Terry Hammons, David N. Gans, Stephen Zuckerman, Katie 
Merrell, William S. Underwood, and Aimee F. Williams. “A House is Not a Home: 
Keeping Patients at the Center of Practice Redesign.” Health Affairs 27, no. 5 
(2008), p. 1226. 
36 Nutting et al., “Transforming Physician Practices to Patient-Centered Medical Homes: 
Lessons from the National Demonstration Project,” p. 440. 
37 Sidorov, Jaan E. “The Patient-Centered Medical Home for Chronic Illness: Is it Ready 
for Prime Time?” Health Affairs 27, no. 5 (2008): 1231-1234, p. 1232. 
38 Bielaszka-DuVernay, Christina. “Improving the Coordination of Care for Medicaid 
Beneficiaries in Pennsylvania.” Health Affairs 30, no. 3 (2011): 426-430, p. 430; 
Bielaszka-DuVernay, Christina. “Taking Public Health Approaches to Care in 
Massachusetts.” Health Affairs 30, no. 3 (2011): 435-438, p. 438. 
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performance is deemed essential for the success of the model.”39 Current payment 
models fall under the categories of fee-for-service (FFS), capitation, or some 
combination of these two core concepts.  
Another challenge to implementing and standardizing medical home 
models includes a characteristic particular to Medicaid recipients. Because 
Medicaid is a means-tested program, there is a lack of continuity in enrollment for 
Medicaid recipients. They frequently “churn on and off” eligibility multiple times 
each year.40 Therefore, primary care providers do not want to be care coordinators 
for this population, as financial reimbursement for their services is not 
guaranteed. Challenges based on the population served also bring into question: 
who are the target populations for medical homes and ACOs. Some argue that the 
most effective way to utilize these models is by targeting specific subpopulations 
– such as Medicaid recipients, disease-specific patients, or the most costly 
patients. Others believe that the models are tools that, once modified and more 
fully developed, can reshape the entire primary care system and health care field. 
Thus far, most demonstrations have been targeted towards specific 
subpopulations; these subpopulations are usually high-user, high-cost patients. By 
targeting the highest cost within the system, program directors hope to lower 
overall health care costs. 
And finally, change fatigue has been cited as a further challenge to 
implementation. Nutting, et al. reveal from a national demonstration project that 
                                                
39 Rittenhouse et al., “Measuring the Medical Home Infrastructure in Large Medical 
Groups,” p. 1257. 
40 Bielaszka-DuVernay, “Taking Public Health Approaches to Care in Massachusetts,” p. 
438. 
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the pace in which practices were obliged to instigate the medical home principles 
created change fatigue, which resulted in “faltering progress, unresolved tension 
and conflict, burn-out and turnover, and both passive and active resistance to 
further change.”41 By no means an exhaustive list of the possible obstacles of 
implementing medical homes, these are important factors to consider as the health 
field and health care policies continue to push for the implementation of medical 
home principles. 
Significance of medical homes’ success 
Literature on the success of medical home models in terms of improving 
care quality and lowering costs has been a mixed bag42 with some researchers 
asserting that medical homes cannot be expected to solve all problems within the 
health system. Until quite recently there had been no published results indicating 
cost savings, and there still remains a lack of head-to-head studies demonstrating 
that a patient-centered medical home performs better than disease management or 
other coordinated care programs.43 Furthermore, when critiquing the high 
expectations and assumptions given to the successful change that medical home 
models would produce, Ehrlich et al. pointed out that “coordination may increase 
costs by revealing unmet needs and improving service access ⁄ usage.”44 However, 
a couple studies have demonstrated cost savings reaped from implementing 
                                                
41 Nutting et al., “Transforming Physician Practices to Patient-Centered Medical Homes: 
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43 Sidorov, “The Patient-Centered Medical Home for Chronic Illness: Is it Ready for 
Prime Time?” p. 1232. 
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medical home models. North Carolina Medicaid saved $231 million in 2005-2006 
with their patient-centered medical home,45 and Group Health Cooperative in 
Washington had a 1.5:1 return on investment, lower physician burnout rates, and 
better patient experiences after the first two years of implementation.46 Finally, 
Takach reviewed findings from Oklahoma, Colorado and Vermont and 
concluded: 
…Modest increases in payment aligned with quality improvement 
standards have not only resulted in promising trends for costs and quality, 
but have also greatly improved access to care…States have found that 
modest increases in payments coupled with other kinds of assistance to 
practices have been enough to motivate providers to meet medical homes 
quality standards.47 
 
With Takach’s findings, it appears that there might be at least “promising” quality 
improvements associated with “modest increases” of state health care spending. 
And while not a certainty such improvements are possible, especially when 
patient-centered medical homes are implemented in a way that addresses the 
challenges previously discussed and when coupled with financial reform. 
 For successful implementation and results, researchers suggest payment 
system reforms, setting a consistent definition and expectations,48 having systems 
and people that are flexible and willing to adapt to change,49 strong commitment 
of health care leaders to support “necessary, structural and personal 
                                                
45 Rittenhouse et al., “Measuring the Medical Home Infrastructure in Large Medical 
Groups,” p. 1257. 
46 Reid et al., “The Group Health Medical Home at Year Two: Cost Savings, Higher 
Patient Satisfaction, and Less Burnout for Providers,” pp. 836-837, 839, 841. 
47 Takach, “Reinventing Medicaid: State Innovations to Qualify and Pay for Patient-
Centered Medical Homes show Promising Results,” p. 1332. 
48 Fields et al., “Driving quality gains and cost savings through adoption of medical 
homes,” p. 825. 
49 Nutting et al., “Transforming Physician Practices to Patient-Centered Medical Homes: 
Lessons from the National Demonstration Project,” p. 441. 
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transformations,”50 helping small practices share resources,51 and placing the 
patient-centered medical home model in the larger health care neighborhood as an 
ACO. As Nutting et al write, “To be successful, the medical home must evolve in 
collaboration with the larger neighborhood, as is envisioned by accountable care 
organizations. Similarly, these organizations need the primary care foundation 
that a medical home can provide.”52 Because of the need to look at reform for the 
whole system, envisioning a neighborhood rather than just a home, ACOs with 
medical homes as their base have captured the attention of health care 
professionals and policy-makers and give hope for positive, systemic reform. 
Payment Methods and Reforms 
 Traditional payment models include fee-for-service and capitation – each 
with their own drawbacks. A fee-for-service model (FFS) gives providers 
payment for each service a patient receives. Such a system incentivizes quantity 
over quality as providers make more money for more services performed. 
Capitation, on the other hand, gives providers a lump sum to care for patients. 
Within this model, providers are incentivized to provide less care – the opposite 
of FFS. In a capitation system, since providers receive the same amount of money 
per patient, they make more money when they provide fewer services to patients. 
In other words, capitation incentivizes denying access to services. While fewer 
                                                
50 Epstein, Ronald M., Kevin Fiscella, Cara S. Lesser, and Kurt C. Stange. “Why the 
Nation Needs A Policy Push on Patient-Centered Health Care.” Health Affairs 29, 
no. 8 (2010): 1489-1495, p. 1493. 
51 Rittenhouse, Diane R., Lawrence P. Casalino, Stephen M. Shortell, Sean R. McClellan, 
Robin R. Gillies, Jeffrey A. Alexander, and Melinda L. Drum. “Small and Medium-
Size Physician Practices Use Few Patient-Centered Medical Home Processes.” 
Health Affairs 30, no. 8 (2011): 1575-84, p. 1583. 
52 Nutting et al., “Transforming Physician Practices to Patient-Centered Medical Homes: 
Lessons from the National Demonstration Project,” p. 443. 
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services may not mean lower quality care, providers and patients need to be 
careful that fewer services do not become a causal variable for poor quality. 
Another issue with capitation is that it discourages providers from caring for the 
sickest patients, those with the most complex health care needs who require the 
most services. 
 In recent years, combinations of FFS and capitation with risk-adjustment 
additions have been used to try to combat the consequences of each of these 
payment methods when used separately. Payment reform has been of particular 
interest in efforts to support the adoption of medical homes and now, ACOs. 
Providers need financial support for the start-up costs of a medical home or an 
ACO, including new health information technology, new personnel and/or 
training of previous staff, and more. As Landon et al argue, “Getting the payments 
right is vital” if reforms within the health system are to be successful and 
eventually become widespread.53  
Many viable payment strategies exist for an ACO to adopt. The important 
piece from these payment strategies is that they create incentives for quality, 
efficiency and effectiveness. Furthermore, some researchers believe that payment 
reform alone is not enough to change the health care system to meet cost and 
quality goals; such payment reforms would produce better results when tied to 
accountability as in an ACO.54 
 
 
                                                
53 Landon et al., “Prospects for Rebuilding Primary Care Using the Patient-Centered 
Medical Home,” p. 830. 
54 McClellan et al., “A National Strategy to Put Accountable Care into Practice.” 
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Current Legislation Concerning Accountable Care Organizations 
The federal government through the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) is currently working on policy regulations for ACO models 
incorporated in the Medicare program. Section 3022 of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act institutes the Medicare Shared Savings program, a program 
that provides for the short-term implementation of ACOs for Medicare 
populations. CMS, the Office of the Inspector General, the Federal Trade 
Commission, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, and the IRS 
have all released proposed regulations for the implementation of these ACOs. The 
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have also issued 
guidelines that allowed ACOs and other innovative health care delivery systems 
to form and operate without violating antitrust laws.55 The regulations require 
ACOs to improve on 65 quality metrics across five domains: patient and 
caregiver’s experience of care, care coordination, patient safety, preventive 
health, and at-risk population health or the health of frail elderly populations.56 In 
addition to ACOs, Medicare under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
now has mechanisms for medical home demonstrations called the Multi-Payer 
Advanced Primary Care Practice Demonstration. Operating under Section 402 of 
PL 90-248, the Social Security Act, as amended (42 USC 1395b-1), providers will 
receive payment for traditional Medicare FFS claims in the standard manner, but 
individual states will pay providers for medical home start-up costs and for 
providing services that are not typically covered by Medicare FFS. This 
                                                
55 McClellan and Fisher. “Accountable Care Organizations: A Framework For Evaluating 
Proposed Rules.” 
56 Ibid. 
40 
 
demonstration is expected to be budget-neutral and emphasize prevention, health 
IT, care coordination and shared decision-making among patients and their 
providers. 
Beyond the federal legislation though, Takach argues that states are the 
breeding ground for innovation in medical homes – and subsequently ACOs: 
The Affordable Care Act allows states to test new – or improve existing – 
patient-centered medical home models… States are laboratories for 
innovation with the patient-centered medical home model. The strategies 
they try and the lessons they learn can inform new approaches to primary 
care in both the public and private sectors.57 
 
Ultimately the recent federal legislation has allowed states to develop innovative 
approaches to health care delivery, testing ACO and medical home models. The 
case study of Hennepin Health used within this paper demonstrates this very 
phenomenon. Minnesota – through new federal and state legislation – was able to 
develop a new approach to delivering health care to specific Medicaid 
populations. What makes Hennepin Health unique and how such a program came 
about will be elaborated on further in the discussion section. 
Challenges of Implementation for ACOs 
 Pitfalls, critiques or concerns: whatever language is used for the 
description, the challenges that ACOs face in terms of inception and 
implementation are numerous. The challenges could include: 
• A lack of common understanding about what an ACO is.58 As was 
previously established, the definition of an ACO is highly flexible and 
ambiguous in terms of structure. While this gives groups of providers 
                                                
57 Takach, “Reinventing Medicaid: State Innovations to Qualify and Pay for Patient-
Centered Medical Homes show Promising Results,” p. 1332. 
58 McClellan et al., “A National Strategy to Put Accountable Care into Practice,” p. 987. 
41 
 
who want to establish an ACO more flexibility and room for creativity, 
it also gives them little guidance as to what works and what does not 
work when establishing and running an ACO. Gathering such 
information will be a vital part of any ACO demonstration project, not 
only to improve the pilot program, but also to generate information 
and experience that can be used in other locations or for other patient 
populations.  
• A lack of knowledge and experience of providers and payers in 
establishing organizational and legal structures of an ACO.59 As with 
any new system, the employees required to implement the new 
structures may lack the necessary knowledge and experience to be able 
to do so successfully. However, a study by the American Medical 
Group Association estimated that more than a hundred member 
medical groups across the nation are ready and able to transition to an 
ACO model.60 And in fact, Crosson writes, “…the accountable care 
organization concept has created an opportunity for physicians and 
hospitals to rethink their respective roles, form working partnerships, 
and even rethink the governance structure of health care delivery 
institutions.”61 Perhaps, ACOs should be better thought of as an 
opportunity for providers and payers to re-define their current roles 
and create new responsibilities within these roles. 
                                                
59 Ibid. 
60 Crosson, “The Accountable Care Organization: Whatever its Growing Pains, the 
Concept is Too Vitally Important to Fail,” p. 1252. 
61 Ibid., p. 1253. 
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• Uncertainty about providers’ financial ability to support an ACO. 
There is a level of uncertainty about the ability of providers to put in 
the capital investment for developing and initially managing an ACO. 
Crosson believes that such an investment is manageable for large 
medical groups; although, problems may arise for medium- or small-
sized medical groups. “But,” he argues, “Many of these costs can be 
mitigated through partnerships with hospitals, arrangements with 
insurance plans, and the development of information systems funded 
by and distributed within local communities.”62 With the lack of 
financial ability and knowledge and experience challenges, some 
would add that while primary care providers are in a better position to 
offer patients sensible, cost-effective choices, hospitals are in a better 
position to lead and operate ACOs because of the up-front costs and 
systems required. However, some health economists are worried that 
hospitals will not be responsive to incentives to reduce spending.63 
This is an additional layer to consider within challenges to 
implementation. 
• Uncertainty about legal ramifications of shared responsibility.64 There 
is a concern that ACOs will accelerate a trend towards hospital 
mergers and the consolidation of health care providers.65 However, the 
federal government is already working to clarify this aspect; as was 
                                                
62 Ibid., p. 1252. 
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64 McClellan et al., “A National Strategy to Put Accountable Care into Practice,” p. 987. 
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previously stated, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission have issued guidance concerning antitrust laws. 
• Fear that ACOs will release a torrent of federal regulations. As of yet, 
this fear is unfounded since only quality measurement regulations are 
foreseen. Furthermore, the accountability nature of ACOs will 
hopefully offer more self-management to replace government-
management.66 
• Low-level patient participation and enrollment. In other words, if we 
build it, will they come? Providers are concerned that patients may not 
want to enroll in or receive their services through an ACO. ACOs may 
be rejected by patients, the public and the media in the same way that 
managed care was rejected in the late 1990s.67 
All of these are considerable challenges to the implementation of ACOs. 
Despite the magnitude of these barriers, McClellan and his associates have some 
suggestions for overcoming them. First, they suggest having a national pilot 
program effort with clear and transparent principles.68 This would allow both 
public and private entities to test what works and what does not work across 
patient populations and regions within the US. Along those same lines, the 
specifications concerning cost and quality measures need to remain consistent.69 
We will only be able to properly evaluate and compare different ACO models if 
the standards to which they are held are the same. State and federal governments 
                                                
66 Crosson, “The Accountable Care Organization: Whatever its Growing Pains, the 
Concept is Too Vitally Important to Fail,” p. 1251. 
67 Ibid., p. 1253. 
68 McClellan et al., “A National Strategy to Put Accountable Care into Practice,” p. 988. 
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should look to provide technical support for implementation.70 They should 
provide opportunities for pilot programs and other institutions to exchange 
experiences and knowledge. ACOs will need assistance in “implementing 
reliable, transparent, timely, and valid measures of quality and cost… [And] 
achieving improvements in measured performance, setting budget benchmarks, 
and addressing legal and other issues.”71 Additionally, newly formed ACOs will 
need financial and technical support for investments in infrastructure, process and 
organization redesign.72 Such support can come through the government or 
through sharing of resources among groups of providers. The final two 
mechanisms to overcoming these involve evaluation. ACOs are going to need on-
going evaluation, which will require a more straightforward process for Medicare 
and Medicaid participation, as well as public participation.73 Furthermore, 
improved antitrust monitoring and evaluation is needed. According to McClellan, 
“Accountable care reforms could provide an alternative way of addressing the 
anticompetitive risk of consolidation.”74 If regulations are written properly, the 
shared accountability and other characteristics of ACOs may mitigate the risk that 
sole consolidation would have. 
As illustrated in previous sections, ACOs and other care delivery model 
reforms face challenges of certification and scalability, uncertain definitions and 
financial viability, unstable Medicaid populations, lack of provider expertise, 
complex legal ramifications and new regulations, unrealistic expectations and 
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73 Ibid., p. 989. 
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change fatigue. The challenges of implementing ACOs parallel many of the 
aspects of implementation that Sabatier & Mazmanian and Majone & Wildavsky 
outline within their policy implementation models. First, for Sabatier & 
Mazmanian, all of the challenges mentioned fit under one or two of their 
categories. For example, the issues that arise from Medicaid’s eligibility and 
enrollment process falls under the category of problem tractability, which 
describes the characteristics of society’s problems and population behavior that 
needs to change through implementation of a policy. The questions concerning 
model definitions and configuration fall under the authors’ category of policy 
structure. Since the general implementation of these models varies greatly, the 
ability of a single policy or one set of policies to structure implementation of new 
delivery models across the nation or even within one state may be challenging. 
Complex legal ramifications and new regulations also fall within Sabatier & 
Mazmanian’s second category with attempts to structure policy for 
implementation. And finally, lack of expertise and financial means to establish 
medical homes and ACOs falls under the authors’ third category – nonstatutory 
variables – because they are resources that policy cannot necessarily structure into 
implementation.  
As for Majone & Wildavsky, their emphasis on change and evolution 
parallels the entire process behind the development of ACOs. ACOs developed 
from medical home models, evolving from a ‘home’ to a ‘neighborhood’ concept. 
Payment, care and delivery models have all gone through significant periods of 
change with ACOs emerging from the trials of HMOs and managed care plans. 
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As new models emerged and new implementation challenges arose, new policies 
and regulations were mandated. The challenges discussed thus far are general 
obstacles to the implementation of ACOs, but through this study, challenges to the 
implementation of a new approach to health care delivery, a modified ACO – 
Hennepin Health – are examined. 
Importance of ACO Success 
 So why is it so important for an ACO to succeed? Why is it so vital that a 
new approach to health care delivery be created and implemented successfully? 
Simply put, the US health care system as is needs reform in order to produce 
better value: lower health care costs and improved health care outcomes. 
“Enhancing value requires both explicit delivery system reform strategies and the 
associated organizational capacity to execute change.”75 Legislative reforms and 
strong leadership is necessary to execute this change, and currently, ACOs have 
been incorporated as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act – the 
most recent and most comprehensive health care legislation. As McClellan 
argues: 
Only by fostering real accountability for both quality and costs – 
effectively linking payments with appropriate investments in infrastructure 
and process improvements – will we be able to make the transition to a 
health care system that better addresses major gaps in performance and 
makes critical clinical and process transformation feasible and sustainable. 
Developing and testing accountable care organizations… represents a 
critical step away from purely volume-driven payments and toward 
payments emphasizing value.76 
 
                                                
75 Paulus, Ronald A., Karen Davis, and Glenn D. Steele. “Continuous Innovation in 
Health Care: Implications of the Geisinger Experience.” Health Affairs 27, no. 5 
(2008): 1235. 
76 McClellan et al., “A National Strategy to Put Accountable Care into Practice,” pp. 989-
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It is crucial for ACOs and other health care delivery system reforms to succeed 
because health care’s overall value is extremely low. By bringing accountability 
into the equation, the hope is to properly incentivize providers and the system for 
quality care over quantity. 
Conclusion 
ACOs are complex care delivery models that incorporate medical homes 
as the foundational care model and a combination of capitation and fee-for-
service. Accountability, or shared risk and responsibility, is the new key element 
to these models. Sabatier & Mazmanian’s model anticipates many of the 
challenges faced in implementing ACOs and other health care delivery system 
reforms. Alternatively, Majone & Wildavksy’s evolution model illustrates the 
evolution of ACO’s development and implementation. Being more familiar with 
these concepts and general challenges helps to foreshadow and highlight the 
challenges that Hennepin Health will face during implementation.  
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Methodology 
Two goals of this project are to determine what policy implementation 
framework best captures health care policymaking, specifically the 
implementation of complex health care reform models such as medical homes and 
ACOs, and then to discern what barriers exist in implementation of ACOs. Using 
the Integrated Health Delivery Network in Hennepin County, Minnesota, as a 
case study, this paper examines implementation of an ACO against two prominent 
policy implementation theories – Majone & Wildavsky’s implementation as 
evolution model and Sabatier & Mazmanian’s conceptual framework of the 
implementation process. As of yet, the two models for policy implementation 
written by Majone & Wildavsky and Sabatier & Mazmanian provide the most 
comprehensive frameworks. Incorporating such topics as tractability of a 
problem, ability of a statute to structure implementation, and evolution of social 
problem and policy solutions, the two models incorporate the complexity that is 
involved with implementation and serve as ideal models to test for health care 
policy implementation. My research combines content analysis of reports and 
statutes with semi-structured, in-depth interviews of key participants involved in 
the processes of implementing medical home services at HCMC and developing 
the new demonstration project.  
Medical home models and ACOs were selected for the examination of 
health care policy as a whole for a few reasons. First, most health care policy is 
inherently complex. Medical home and ACO policy with all its intricacy can be 
seen as a microcosm of a comprehensive health care policy for those wishing to 
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examine the process of implementing a model or policy that is difficult to define, 
to set clear goals for, and to measure successful outcomes. And second, the health 
care field in the US is moving towards the integration of ACOs. While just in 
their beginning stages, ACOs are envisioned as the next wave in health care 
policy reform. Hennepin County’s Integrated Health Delivery Network was 
specifically selected as a case study because of a couple unique characteristics, 
including the population it serves and the social disparity approach it employs. 
Both of these unique characteristics provide a preliminary glance into the 
direction that health care policy may take.  
Interview Process 
Interviews were used to examine implementation within this case study 
because participants – the implementers of the project help reconstruct the process 
of development and implementation. Through his street-level bureaucracy model, 
Lipsky intrigued political scientists and changed research concerning policy 
implementation. Lipsky developed the model of street-level bureaucracy, 
claiming that policies are truly defined by public service workers – or street level 
bureaucrats as he defined them – because they are how the public encounters 
government. The street-level bureaucracy model gives enormous amounts of 
power to public service workers, which ultimately undermines the role that 
policy-makers and other conditions might have on the implementation of a policy. 
Sabatier & Mazmanian provide more balance to implementation within their 
framework. Their first and second stages – which focus on the agency level and 
target groups – could be slightly expanded to incorporate individuals within 
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government agencies and individuals that work for and report to agencies. Majone 
& Wildavsky, on the other hand, compare and contrast their implementation as 
evolution model to a different model – one that they refer to as implementation as 
interaction – which is centrally grounded in Lipsky’s ideas about street-level 
bureaucrats and the interaction and communication that occurs between local 
level officials who are implementing policies and policy-creators. Although 
Majone & Wildavsky’s implementation as evolution model moves away from a 
sole focus on interaction and communication, these qualities are still contained 
within the model. Therefore, Majone & Wildavsky, like Sabatier & Mazmanian, 
give some value to Lipsky’s elevation of street-level bureaucrat input. By 
interviewing physicians and clinic medical directors, how the medical home 
model and ACO principles are actually formed and carried out at the local 
government- and practice-level is better assessed.  
The first participants for the study were selected based on 
recommendations from informational interviews and the remaining participants 
were selected using snowball sampling, where participants were asked to 
recommend other potential participants for the study. Eleven interviews were 
conducted, recorded and transcribed. Interview duration was from 25 to 50 
minutes, and all interviews were held within participants’ offices. Participants – 
which included Minnesota’s State Medicaid Director, the Hennepin County 
Administrator, current and former state legislators, and Hennepin County Medical 
Center’s Chief Medical Information Officer – were enthusiastic to discuss the 
demonstration project and willing to offer multiple suggestions for other 
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individuals to contact. During the interviews, participants were asked questions 
concerning the genesis and justification for the Hennepin County demonstration 
project, policies that support the project, individuals involved, negotiations made 
for payment and management, project evaluation, challenges and barriers, and the 
future of the project. 
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Hennepin Health: A Case Study 
 This section describes the Hennepin Health project, followed by a 
discussion of current implementation challenges, which are sorted under four 
categories: shared governance, means-tested programs, US health care and 
program evaluation. Afterwards is an examination of how the two implementation 
models fit with this case study, ending with the implications Hennepin Health and 
its potential success has for future health care and social service policy and for 
policy implementation research and study limitations. 
What is the Hennepin Health project? 
Launched on January 1, 2012, Hennepin Health is an integrated health 
care delivery system demonstration project operated by Hennepin County in 
Minnesota, projected to serve 12,000 individuals from the Medicaid population, 
and run through four core partners:  
• Hennepin County Medical Center (HCMC) – a Level 1 trauma center, 
county (public) hospital and network of primary and specialty care clinics. 
• NorthPoint Health and Wellness Center – a county-run, full-service 
outpatient primary care clinic and a Federally Qualified Health Center 
(FQHC).1 It was also the first certified health care home in Minnesota.2 
• Hennepin County Human Services and Public Health Department 
(HSPHD) – a county agency that “determines eligibility for Medicaid, as 
                                                
1 FQHCs are community-based primary and preventive care clinics with services 
reimbursed by the federal government under the Health Center Consolidation Act 
(Section 330 of the Public Health Service Act). 
2 “Integrated Health Delivery Network: A Social Disparities Approach to Health & 
Health Care.” Human Services and Public Health Department, Hennepin County 
(2011), p. 11. 
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well as other health and economic support programs, administers 
community mental health and substance abuse services, and provides 
public health and human services.”3 
•  Metropolitan Health Plan (MHP) – the state’s only publicly owned health 
maintenance organization (HMO).  
These four entities collaborate with an aim toward improving the quality of care 
for its enrollees through a more efficient care delivery system. Within their 
collaboration, Hennepin County acts as the final risk-bearing entity.4 The 
demonstration project also contracts with over 50 other providers. 
 The target population – those eligible to receive services through the 
program – will consist of approximately 12,000 single adults without children 
who live at or below 75 percent of the federal poverty line. This population has 
high chemical dependency and mental health issues, as well as a significant 
number of individuals with housing instability and chronic illnesses.5 Such 
characteristics are disproportionately high as compared to non-Medicaid 
populations and shed light on the complexity involved with caring for this 
particular population. Program enrollees are high users of both the health care and 
social service systems. 
The goals of the demonstration project reflect the same goals of ACOs and 
other innovative integrated health care delivery system reforms. The first goal is 
to improve overall health outcomes for patients; this includes improving the 
                                                
3 Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
4 Godfrey, David. Interviewed by Kaitlin Roh. Personal Interview. Saint Paul, January 
23, 2012. 
5 “Integrated Health Delivery Network: A Social Disparities Approach to Health & 
Health Care,” p. 4. 
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quality and length of their lives and their overall experience within the health care 
system. The second part of the project’s objective is to lower administrative and 
service costs to the county, state and federal government. In order to reduce costs, 
the program ultimately seeks to reduce emergency room use, extended 
hospitalization and other high-cost medical services. Reducing costs on the 
medical side would allow more county money to be distributed to other services, 
such as housing, mental health and unemployment. A final additional caveat to 
the second half of Hennepin Health’s objective is to create a sustainable and 
replicable health care program.6 
In order to meet these goals, Hennepin Health has adopted several key 
program components: a patient-centered medical home, an electronic health 
record (HER) combined with an integrated data warehouse, a patient tiering 
system, an integrated system of providers, and a capitated financial model. The 
first of these critical aspects is its foundation as a patient-centered medical home, 
emphasizing care coordination and a base in primary, preventive care. This care 
model reflects many of the same values of former patient-centered medical home 
models as discussed in previous sections, including care delivery through a health 
care team and a whole person orientation that incorporates medical care, 
behavioral care and human needs as appropriate.7 A participant in this study 
pointed out the important role of primary care and having one point of 
coordination for patients, stating, “…one of the main ways to create efficiency 
and to create value in the way that care is delivered is to transform and strengthen 
                                                
6 “Integrated Health Delivery Network: A Social Disparities Approach to Health & 
Health Care,” p. 4. 
7 Ibid. 
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the role of primary care.” 8 The US health care delivery system is fragmented with 
little coordination between primary care and specialty care. As was pointed out 
with medical homes, there has been a movement for primary care physicians to 
become care coordinators, but without deeper reform, such work has not been 
successful. Using a medical home as the base, the Hennepin Health project works 
to blend the delivery of previously disjointed county systems: social, behavior and 
medical services.9  
Another important component is the development of a data warehouse 
where each patient will have a “single, comprehensive” electronic health record 
that incorporates both medical and social service information. Prior to the 
implementation of this project, these records were kept in separate information 
systems.10 Alongside the electronic health records and data warehouse is a 
patient-tiering system, which will evaluate and place Hennepin Health patients in 
three categories based on high-utilization and high-risk qualities. Such a system 
allows the program to focus resources and energy on the patients that ultimately 
cost the most money for the county. 
Finally, Hennepin Health’s financial model has a capitation and risk-
sharing format.11 The Hennepin Health model is based on a total cost of care 
calculation where the total cost of care comes from the Minnesotan Medicaid 
benefit set, which was determined by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
                                                
8 Owen, Ross. Interviewed by Kaitlin Roh. Personal Interview. Saint Paul, February 17, 
2012; “One of the core pillars of the care model is the health care home.” (Clifford, 
Pamela. Interviewed by Kaitlin Roh. Personal Interview. Minneapolis, February 14, 
2012.) 
9 “Integrated Health Delivery Network: A Social Disparities Approach to Health & 
Health Care,” p. 5. 
10 Ibid., p. 9. 
11 Ibid. 
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Services.12 Through the Metropolitan Health Plan (MHP), the program has 
entered into a contract with Minnesota’s Department of Human Services (DHS) to 
provide managed care services for Medicaid patients.13 MHP will then pay for 
medical services by contracted rates to both the other partners and contracted 
providers.14 The contracted rates are estimates of the amount spent per enrollee 
and based on actuarial data.15 As in any risk- and savings-sharing financial model, 
if the program is able to cut costs by reducing emergency room use, hospital 
admissions/readmissions and other acute care through preventive care, then the 
core partners will share in the savings. However, if costs continue to increase, 
then the partners will share in the loss of revenue with a negotiated maximum 
amount of risk sharing.16 Savings from risk sharing within the first few years is 
complicated though as any savings seen during that time will be funneled into 
initial investments in infrastructure.17  
This project also has a comprehensive evaluation and quality measurement 
plan – an important feature, particularly for the future institution of similar 
projects across the nation and the ability to learn from this initial program’s 
successes and pitfalls. 
 
 
                                                
12 “Integrated Health Delivery Network: A Social Disparities Approach to Health & 
Health Care,” p. 17. 
13 Services contracted through MHP are done so through a PMAP contract. As such, 
Hennepin Health is bound to the conditions of a PMAP contract. 
14 “Integrated Health Delivery Network: A Social Disparities Approach to Health & 
Health Care,” p. 17. 
15 Ibid., p. 18. 
16 Ibid 
17 Ibid. 
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 How Hennepin Health compares to a typical ACO 
 Hennepin Health is not a typical ACO.18 Like an ACO, Hennepin Health 
is designed to create accountability around health wellness.19 However, Hennepin 
Health has a few key differences. First and most importantly, an ACO is not 
required to be an HMO or its own insurance provider; in fact, most ACOs are not 
also HMOs. Hennepin Health, on the other hand, is an HMO and has its own 
insurance plan through MHP. Todd Monson, Area Director for Hennepin County 
Human Services and Public Health Department, explained that the HMO is “deep 
into” this model with the HMO doing some of the “eligibility work, the 
recruitment, retention and some of the contracting.” 20 With the inclusion of MHP 
as one of the core partners, Hennepin Health has an HMO and therefore is not an 
ACO as the literature currently specifies. Second, the program is taking care of a 
population that has enrolled in and chosen MHP as their managed care plan.21 As 
stated previously, the creators of ACOs stipulated that patients do not need to 
specifically enroll in the ACO in order to participate. Perhaps it can be thought of 
as a “modified”22 or “hybrid”23 ACO as Hennepin Health is an integrated delivery 
system reform using accountability for outcomes rather than fee-for-service 
                                                
18 DeCubellis, Jennifer. Interviewed by Kaitlin Roh. Personal Interview. Minneapolis, 
February 22, 2012. 
19 “The accountability for the care of the patient and truly accepting that as a value-based 
proposition as opposed to fee-for-service – [Hennepin Health is] true to that 
concept.” (Clifford) 
20 Monson, Todd. Interviewed by Kaitlin Roh. Personal Interview. Minneapolis, February 
16, 2012. 
21 Jacques, Molly. Interviewed by Kaitlin Roh. Personal Interview. Minneapolis, January 
26, 2012. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Monson. 
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reimbursement. But in the end, the project is “not an ACO”24 by literature 
definition.25 
 Along that same line, Hennepin Health has a contract with DHS through 
MHP, but functions differently than MHP formerly operated. Pamela Clifford, 
Director of HCMC’s Center for Healthcare Innovation, explained that within the 
short timeframe, Hennepin County, HCMC and the other partners chose to 
contract with Minnesota’s Department of Human Services under a prepaid 
Medical Assistance (Minnesota’s Medicaid program) contract.26 Unfortunately, 
she explained, “This will be MHP doing business as Hennepin Health… We’re 
held to all the requirements [of a typical State-County Medicaid contract],27 but 
we’re different in many regards from that.”28 Since Hennepin Health neither fits 
the old contract requirements it is held to or the new regulations being issued by 
the federal government concerning ACOs, challenges arise concerning outdated 
statutes and governance. More about these challenges is discussed later in this 
section. 
 The other two characteristics that make Hennepin Health different than a 
typical ACO are the population served and the social service providers brought 
into the model. Hennepin Health’s population is a Medicaid population whereas 
                                                
24 Clifford. 
25 After reviewing the literature, it can be argued that the exact definition of an ACO is 
much more open-ended allowing the flexibility to incorporate an HMO as long as the 
accountability for outcomes piece remains in place. In that sense, Hennepin Health 
could best be referred to as a modified-ACO as one participant called it. In my 
opinion, the concept name given to this demonstration project is irrelevant. What is 
important is the way in which the reform model works. 
26 Clifford. 
27 The contract between DHS and Hennepin Health through MHP is a PMAP contract. 
Certain stipulations go along with this type of contract. 
28 Clifford. 
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ACOs currently conceptualized and initiated under the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act are for Medicare populations.29 Medicaid is a means-tested 
program to provide health care services to individuals and families with low 
income and limited resources. Some Medicaid recipients also qualify through 
disability eligibility. The Medicaid program is funded and operated jointly by the 
state and federal governments. Within Minnesota, the state funds and regulates 
the program, but Medicaid is run through the county governments. In other words, 
counties are responsible for the ground-level work. Medicare, on the other hand, 
is a social insurance program for individuals over 65 or who qualify based on 
disability. Medicare is entirely funded, regulated and operated through the federal 
government. 
Most ACOs are only bringing together medical providers. Hennepin 
Health, on the other hand, is bringing in social service providers in addition to 
health care providers. All these providers then have an invested interest to 
participate in the care of an individual as they share costs.30 The role of social 
services within the care delivery model is further examined throughout this 
section. In the end, Hennepin Health is not the typical ACO, but it does share in 
the same goals of reducing health care costs and improving health outcomes. 
Overall though, Hennepin Health can still be used as a generalizable case study 
because Hennepin Health, like an ACO, is a new health care delivery model. 
ACOs and other new health care delivery models face many of the same 
implementation challenges. 
                                                
29 DeCubellis. 
30 Jacques. 
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Challenges to Implementation 
 As seen within the review of ACO models and other types of health care 
delivery system reform, challenges to implementing reforms that are new, 
innovative and/or expansive – like Hennepin Health – can be significant and even 
create barriers to their success. With the inherent complexity of health care policy 
implementation and the multiple variables involved within the Hennepin Health 
project, it is easy to see that Hennepin Health’s twin aim of lowering costs and 
improving health outcomes faces many roadblocks. This study’s participants 
expanded on the most significant barriers they believe exist for the program. 
Those challenges speak to a few issues that are not unique to Hennepin County. In 
fact, a few of the barriers to implementation reflect the same barriers that 
literature concerning ACOs forecast. The challenges examined within this study 
fit into four broad categories: 1) shared governance, 2) means-tested programs, 3) 
US health care culture and 4) program evaluation. Following is a discussion of the 
specific Hennepin Health challenges that fit within these categories. In addition, 
participants were in a few instances able to articulate steps the partners are taking 
to address such barriers. 
 Shared Governance 
 The United States’ governmental structure with three levels – local 
(county), state and federal – has created collaboration, coordination and 
organization problems. These structural issues are sewn into the fabric of 
American federalism as states are required to abide by federal law and local 
governments must adhere to state regulations. The layering and distribution of 
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regulations and responsibilities requires extensive communication and 
coordination to ensure that policies are followed properly and constituents receive 
adequate services. Moreover, shared governance and responsibilities has also led 
to a competition for resources among various levels of government and among 
departments within local governments. The problems associated with shared 
governance fit under Sabatier & Mazmanian’s first two categories: problem 
tractability and structure through policy. Shared governance has itself inherent 
problems that are difficult to define and address, and these problems lead to 
difficulty in writing policy that properly structures implementation. As such, a 
model that is flexible and gives much discretion to the local level and individuals 
involved in implementing the model – like ACOs – is going to be problematic to 
structure at the state or federal level. In other words, creating a state or national 
standard for ACOs – one set of policies that regulates all new delivery systems – 
is extremely hard, and most likely, impossible. Some of the specific challenges 
that Hennepin Health faces reveal inherent problems seen within shared 
governance. The three challenges specifically expressed by the project 
participants are sharing information among the project partners, building 
collaborative rather than competitive relationships, and the lack of defined 
administration and ground-level management. 
Sharing information 
 One of the most important components for the success of Hennepin Health 
is the ability to share information among the four core partners and contracted 
private and public providers. The sharing of information across systems is the 
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element of an ACO or health care delivery model that allows the entire model to 
work properly and generate higher levels of efficiency. If HCMC is not able to 
share pertinent patient information with the county’s housing department, then the 
housing department may not be able to make the best assessment for prioritizing 
the distribution of housing units. In the same respect, information coming from 
the county’s Department of Human Services and Public Health about a patient’s 
housing status and living situation could be vital for a physician trying to help a 
patient. One example that was given was about a patient with diabetes who does 
not have a refrigerator to properly store insulin. If the physician is unaware that 
this is the underlying cause of why the patient continued to have trouble 
regulating his/her blood sugar levels, then no amount of instruction on insulin use 
would help the patient.31 This is why sharing information among the systems is so 
vital to this project’s success.  
Out-dated statutes and uncertainty in the legality of sharing patient 
information among the partners were cited by participants as the greatest 
challenges to achieving patient care coordination. As innovation occurs at the 
local level, state and federal regulations – which ultimately govern local projects 
– need to continually evolve to accommodate new needs and situations. Out-dated 
regulations can therefore be detrimental to local innovation. Each of the different 
county entities is confined by separate patient privacy policies. The federal 
                                                
31 Berglin, Linda. Interviewed by Kaitlin Roh. Personal Interview. Minneapolis, January 
13, 2012; “We believe that for a very poor people, you can’t meet their health care 
needs properly without addressing their basic social needs as well. We have someone 
that comes into the emergency room regularly, every week, because she lives in a 
room – she has diabetes – and she doesn’t have a kitchen, so she doesn’t have a 
refrigerator, so every week her insulin isn’t good anymore. Every week she is out of 
whack because she’s hasn’t been able to use properly stored insulin. So what does a 
dorm refrigerator cost? Forty bucks. This is ridiculous” (Berglin). 
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government regulates patient privacy for medical services, and then the social 
services sector – which operates at the state level – follows Minnesota welfare 
statutes for client privacy. As one participant stated:  
So there are a lot of really exciting things to do as an integrated system, 
but the laws do not clearly allow all the leeway we would like to have. For 
example, there are welfare statutes that guide what we can share on the 
social services side, and there are health record statutes on the health care 
side. There isn’t something that addresses this new world where we are 
bringing the two sides together and what can or cannot be shared for the 
benefit of the individual…It makes it more difficult with the statutes not 
quite being up to date for these demonstration projects, and that is to the 
fault of the statutes. We’re treading new water where it hasn’t been clearly 
defined.32 
 
The partners are uncertain of what information can legally be exchanged amongst 
all the partners. State and federal statutes have been changed through the 2008 
Minnesota health reform and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act to 
allow separate government entities to work together. So now, the governance and 
workflows of the welfare sector and the health care sector can operate together. 
But the laws that regulate patient privacy in each county and state department 
have not been changed. Therefore, the Hennepin Health core partners have not yet 
been able to exchange information about a patient without first gaining explicit 
consent.  
Clifford explained in more detail that MHP and the entire Hennepin 
Health program is operating under a particular contract with the state and is 
therefore held to the data-sharing and data-privacy components of that contract.33 
This has slowed the initial on-set of program information sharing and frustrated a 
few of the individuals involved in Hennepin Health. Jennifer DeCubellis, Area 
                                                
32 DeCubellis. 
33 Clifford. 
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Director, Hennepin County Human Services and Public Health Department, 
described the process by which Hennepin Health was eliciting initial consent from 
patients to be able to share information: 
So at this point our health plan isn’t able to do outreach to entire members. 
We can’t use our entire system to do that because of the limitation of the 
statutes. Once we touch individuals for the first time and get that consent, 
then we’re looking to share the information across the systems [to provide 
benefits to patients]. That’s the goal, but it ties our hand a little bit on the 
front end as we work through some of the legalities…[We want to do] 
what’s best for the individual within the abilities of the law.34 
 
Clifford confirmed this initial hold-up in her own comments, explaining that 
patients who were originally enrolled in MHP and who have now been transferred 
over to the Hennepin Health plan and program were not aware that they may be 
changing to Hennepin Health when they signed on.35 She continued saying: 
How is it that we can do something entirely new, maintain the patients’ 
confidentiality and privacy, but be able to see what effect we’re having as 
well as being able to utilize some of that information in a way that can 
positively affect our patients in their care…given all the legal constraints 
around the different partners? 
 
Here again was a reiteration of the importance of being able to share information 
among partners for the successful completion of the project’s goals. Another 
participant agreed, stating, “[T]o share information…is fundamental to the 
success of any true partnership.”36 Although not an issue of governance, technical 
issues of information sharing have been a frequent problem within the US health 
care system. Clifford mentioned the technical obstacles to getting all partners to 
share information within the electronic record warehouse. The combination of 
deficient statutes and regulations within the legal realm of information sharing 
                                                
34 DeCubellis. 
35 Clifford. 
36 Jacques. 
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and the technical hiccups to the establishment and use of the data warehouse have 
been considerable barriers for the launch of Hennepin Health. 
Competition 
 Due to the structure of the government, many county and state 
departments are pitted against each other in competition for resources, making 
collaboration difficult if not impossible. Consequently, the next challenge to 
implementation is general collaboration across county systems and distinct 
departments as the project attempts to move the partners away from this 
competition for limited resources. One participant stated, “We’re used to working 
in separate camps,” calling former relationships among the separate county 
entities as “intense” and possibly even “confrontational” at times.37 The Hennepin 
County Administrator Richard Johnson explained why such collaboration might 
be difficult: 
[County departments are] independent for a reason…Part of the issue that 
reflects is that the different players have earned their money or gained 
their revenue [through] different ways. They have different 
accountabilities for their expenditures. They’re always concerned about 
the risk-reward process at the end.38 
 
Essentially, each department was responsible for a particular portion of an 
individual’s care and needs. The social services sector was responsible for 
housing and cash assistance among other items; HCMC was responsible for the 
individual’s health care needs, and so on. As a result, each of these entities 
received their compensation from the county for only those particular actions. 
                                                
37 Clifford; Monson agreed stating, “There’s always all kinds of institutional fighting, just 
disagreements.” 
38 Johnson, Richard. Interviewed by Kaitlin Roh. Personal Interview. Minneapolis, 
February 23, 2012. 
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Now, however, through collaboration, the essence of the project is to share 
resources. The partners share the responsibility – the accountability – for each 
client holistically because the risk-reward equation has been changed in an effort 
to produce better results. Furthermore, simply agreeing on protocols and 
workflows39 to reach a common objective can be a challenge.  
Competition can drive up costs and produce waste within the system. 
Particularly within health care, duplication of services is a common phenomenon. 
DeCubellis explains: 
Providers are used to competing with each other. And in this new world, 
what we’re challenging the providers to do is to come to the table, to be 
transparent about what they are doing and not compete. And in reality, in 
health care with where we’re going, there’s no reason for us to compete 
because there is plenty of business. There’s more business than any of us 
can handle unfortunately. And when we compete, that’s where we 
duplicate services…it’s a community problem and it’s going to take a 
community solution. And so we all have to get creative; we have to be 
willing to share.40 
 
Competition is a driver behind duplication of services and system waste 
production for a couple reasons. First, duplication of lab and medical tests is 
typical when health care providers cannot share information and records in real 
time, or at least close to real time. And second, competition produces waste 
because the separate entities are less willing to share a procedure or program that 
works, instead allowing the others to continue using ineffective and/or inefficient 
mechanisms. As such, DeCubellis suggests that all partners and contracted 
providers make both their successes and failures public. Broadcasting such 
information will allow the exchange of good ideas and ability to avoid repeating 
                                                
39 Richard Johnson. 
40 DeCubellis. 
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ineffective approaches.41 As Clifford describes, collaboration is both “the glory 
and the Achilles’ heel” of the project.42 
Administrative structure and ground-level management 
 With regulations coming from all levels of government, translating these 
regulations and ideas into a new county administrative structure and ground-level 
management and procedures is difficult. Simply put, “Many of us feel that the 
biggest challenge right now is governance. We have a lot of people interested in 
this, committed to it, and working to make it happen, but we do not know how to 
make decisions, make contracts, or prioritize across a wide set of stakeholders.”43 
There is no clear line of authority or accountability from the street-level and 
through to the top with the county administrator. Again, like sharing information, 
the challenge of an undefined governance and management structure is closely 
related to the challenge of collaborative work. Governance structures have been 
defined and are in operation for each of the separate county departments, but now 
that the departments are being held accountable as a whole, a new governance 
structure needs to be built. Seen through Sabatier & Mazmanian’s model, there is 
a need for policies to better structure ground-level work. Together the partners 
must decide on a new set of responsibilities both within their work and to each 
other. Dr. Paul Johnson, Medical Director of HCMC’s Coordinated Care Clinic, 
describes his apprehensions about the lack of governance: 
We need to have better administrative structure if we want to 
succeed…Organizations are working together that haven’t worked 
                                                
41 Ibid. 
42 Clifford. 
43 Larsen, Kevin, MD. Interviewed by Kaitlin Roh. Personal Interview. Minneapolis, 
January 23, 2012. 
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together well before. There’s a lot of good faith in leadership from places 
but there’s no administrative structure to support change. And no funding 
structure to support change...It’s really a problem. It rolls up to a lack of 
governance. There isn’t an independent governance structure for whatever 
it is we’re creating. And so it’ll be a good faith effort of the part of the 
managers from the different partners to work together.44 
 
In other words, a governance structure needs to be instituted, at least in some 
form, in order for the partners and providers to know how to work together. It 
would appear that the challenge of collaboration and governance go hand in hand.  
Additionally, Dr. Johnson goes on to include the idea of accountability in 
relation to collaboration and governance. He states: 
How can you be accountable as a care organization if you don’t know 
what your accountabilities are? Where do our accountabilities roll up? 
Basically we have MHP accountabilities rolling up to MHP and health 
services to HSPSD, all the accountabilities rolling up into their own silos 
and then a lot of handshaking and good faith effort to be better partners, 
but there’s no change in the management structure.45 
 
Such questions are vital to answer in order to move the program towards success. 
Dr. Johnson provided two examples to illustrate these questions; both are real 
experiences from his work through HCMC’s Coordinated Care Clinic. One 
patient came to the Coordinated Care Clinic needing cash assistance from the 
county.46 The standard procedure is to have the individual pick up the application 
form from a county office, then go to their health care provider to have the form 
completed, and then return the form to the county office. But the question being 
asked is can this process be more efficient and easier for the client. In the same 
respect, Hennepin Health currently has a patient enrolled who has been admitted 
                                                
44 Johnson, Paul, MD. Interviewed by Kaitlin Roh. Personal Interview. Minneapolis, 
January 27, 2012. 
45 Ibid. 
46 “Single adults with no income can get $203 from the county through cash assistance if 
they have a medical form completed” (Dr. Paul Johnson). 
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into a nursing home. The patient has severe diabetes and mental health problems, 
and when her primary care physician was consulted, he believed she would 
remain the nursing home indefinitely because of her continued and increased 
immobility. This patient has not yet been formerly identified as a dual-eligible47 
with her disability status. As a dual-eligible she does not fit the population 
description the program was set up to serve, but without being properly identified 
for and enrolled as a dual eligible, she will remain in Hennepin Health. 
Furthermore, because of how expensive her care is between the nursing home and 
other services, Hennepin Health is losing a large chunk of the capitated bundle it 
receives. Then to complicate the situation further, there is no structure or 
governance to indicate which partner or staff is responsible for helping the patient 
to be correctly placed and receive the proper benefits.48 In both of these instances, 
the challenge is a lack of defined roles and responsibilities. In the first, the 
consequences are placed on the individual, and in the second, Hennepin Health is 
faced with loss of revenue. 
 Beyond partner collaboration, the coordination of on-ground staffing and 
roles is another challenge that Hennepin Health faces. The ground level work of 
getting staff hired, defining their roles and integrating all staff within one system 
will be difficult. The challenge will be to go from operating at “100,000 feet”49 
                                                
47 A dual-eligible is a person who is eligible to receive both Medicaid and Medicare 
benefits due to the combination of their economic situation and disability status 
and/or age. 
48 Dr. Paul Johnson. 
49 Clifford. 
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with “agreements and 125-page documents and data sets”50 to the ground level 
where the “frontline staff”51 know what they are supposed to do or say. 
 Part of the development of workflows and operations will be to make them 
more patient-centered. The program wants to have a whole-person perspective as 
they attempt to address the individual’s needs. The ideal is to be more 
relationship-based through effective and efficient collaboration rather than 
working separately: “We’re trying to be very relationship based because that’s 
what we think will make it successful. It is trying to figure out how it is that we 
do this – that’s the challenge because it’s a whole new way of doing things.”52 
Two examples in how the planners have been thinking about the patient-centered 
concept first concern the relationship between housing and health care and 
second, the coordination of care for patients if/when they seek care outside of 
Hennepin Health. For the housing question, the goal is to allow the health care 
teams to be a part of the identification and prioritization of patients for housing. In 
other words, the care coordination staff can help patients with housing paperwork. 
The patient “get[s] the ‘Hennepin Health card’ and go[es] straight to housing.”53 
The second example tries to address the issue of patients seeking care outside of 
the system and answering questions such as how to coordinate their care with 
other systems when necessary and who is responsible for outreach to those 
                                                
50 Larsen. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Clifford. 
53 Ibid. 
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patients to bring them back into the Hennepin Health system. Hennepin Health is 
working hard to be patient-centered rather than system-centered.54 
 Means-tested programs 
The main problem that means-tested welfare programs face is unstable 
patient enrollment. Fragmentation within the system worsens enrollment issues 
and ultimately drives up costs. As was hinted at in the previous sections, unstable 
patient enrollment within a means-tested program is a problem tractability issue 
and can lead to resource55 problems (part of Sabatier & Mazmanian’s third 
category, nonstatutory variables). Hennepin Health clearly demonstrates this 
typical occurrence, and patient enrollment has been identified as both a short-term 
and long-term challenge. In the short term, with the launch of Hennepin Health on 
January 1, 2012, all the care team staff had still not been hired, and their roles and 
workflows had not yet been established. Therefore, clients may choose to leave 
the program as they may not yet know who their care team is and therefore do not 
feel invested in the program.56 The project needs to avoid early rejection due to 
infrastructure not being in place. Furthermore, in the long term, Hennepin Health 
has the challenge of maintaining a critical mass in order to make the program 
financially sustainable and to demonstrate improved health and financial 
outcomes. Because of choice – the ability for patients to enroll or remove 
                                                
54 “How do we make it easier? How do we make it a one-stop shop being very patient-
centered? It’s not centered around the county system. It’s centered around the 
patient” (Clifford). 
55 Again, when Sabatier & Mazmanian refer to resource problems, they are referring to 
both intangible resources – such as expertise – and tangible resources – such as 
funding. 
56 As Monson asked, “So, will we retain clients at a time when it’s not clear who their 
care team is?” Godfrey reiterated this sentiment stating, “First, they [Hennepin 
Health] have a lot of work to get their infrastructure up, but also to maintain [a client 
base] so that [the clients] are not opting out all the time.” 
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themselves from the program – Hennepin Health and all its actors need to work 
constantly for high patient satisfaction: 
There is the ability for people to opt out of Hennepin Health in the same 
way that they can opt out of BlueCross, Medica or HealthPartners. 
Sustaining enough enrollment in this model to make the financial aspects 
work and to create enough of a critical mass population to demonstrate 
good outcomes will be a challenge…[Is there] enough patient satisfaction 
to keep people in that model and to be comfortable with the options and 
provider relationships that are available to them?57  
 
Patient satisfaction is only one part of the equation to maintaining a critical mass 
though. The population that Hennepin Health is serving is a population that 
frequently rotates on and off benefits. In a previous program involving the same 
population, HCMC had space for 9,000 patients. They never reached that number, 
but over the course of the 9-month program, HCMC had over 12,000 patients 
through their system.58 These previous figures demonstrate the vast amount of 
population instability and its potential to affect the operation of the program. 
Turnover of benefits happens about every eight months59 and is likely caused by 
the fact that many of the individuals are homeless or have unstable housing60 and 
therefore do not receive the required renewal forms by mail. Furthermore, as 
some live in a constant state of crisis, they may be more concerned with obtaining 
food and shelter for that day or week than tracking down the proper forms from 
various county offices. Those behind the establishment and structuring of 
Hennepin Health believe that the solution lies in having an “active strategy.”61 
                                                
57 Owen; “[Maintaining enrollment] will depend on patient satisfaction among other 
things” (Godfrey). 
58 Larsen. 
59 DeCubellis. 
60 They are a “transient population.” (DeCubellis) 
61 Larsen. 
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The strategy is to gain access to the eligibility dates from the state of Minnesota. 
This would allow the different providers to see when a client’s Medicaid benefits 
are going to expire and when they need to apply for renewal. Then the providers 
can help the clients fill out the proper paperwork to retain benefits. As 
DeCubelllis explains, “…instead of bouncing them out of the system or between 
systems…we have the ability to keep up our record on them, keep them engaged 
in care, and help them retain benefits.”62 
 Such action will ultimately save the state money for two reasons. First, the 
state previously paid outside contractors to do outreach to this community in an 
effort to prevent them from churning on and off benefits. Now, such costs will be 
absorbed within the capitation payments that Hennepin Health receives, as their 
own staff will be doing these services.63 And secondly, this active policy reduces 
costs because patients are less likely to drop out of the system and therefore less 
likely to stop medication or preventive care – the cessation of which most likely 
increases emergency department usage, and subsequently cost, increases.64 
Because of previous success with HCMC’s HIV program65 that has such an 
outreach policy, Hennepin Health will likely have similar successes for 
maintenance of benefits. 
                                                
62 DeCubellis. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 “So in our successful programs, like our HIV program, they have for 1500 patients one 
or two people who all they do is manage enrollment. So we have to have an active 
strategy. And the way that eligibility works is that they have to prove their level of 
poverty. Fill out all their paperwork. And to do that they have to be really motivated 
to find the forms and be living in the same place for those forms to come to you and 
you know what to do with them. So what our HIV program figured out is that they 
track in their system when are the patients due and they essentially case manage this 
form filling and enrollment work. So we’re hoping to be able to do that same thing” 
(Larsen). 
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 US Health Care System Challenges 
 The challenge that the US health care system faces in general is matching 
the right payment model and care model, creating financial incentives that 
produce better care. Like the challenge of defining ground-level management 
through policy from higher levels, correctly matching care and payment models to 
better incentivize providers to produce better health outcomes for patients 
involves the ability of policies and statutes to structure implementation. Policies 
need to structure implementation of both care and payment models. Obtaining 
better health outcomes comes from both the care and payment models and how 
policy structured the models implementation. The US health care system has 
historically been reimbursed through a fee-for-service model. Within the fee-for-
service mindset, providers focus solely on individuals and individual services 
because payment is received through individual services. A culture has been built 
within the system, therefore, that incentivizes providers to build their practices 
around these individual encounters instead of more broadly designing processes 
and practices for entire populations. Two participants expanded on this issue. Dr. 
Johnson stated: 
Starting to look at populations as opposed to individual encounters and 
how do you create groups of providers that will take ownership around 
patient populations – however we define that population – that’s a re-
orientation of provider perspective. That will take time for providers.66 
 
Rather than focusing on individual patients and individual encounters with these 
patients, Hennepin Health hopes to take a more holistic approach to the 
population. Dr. Johnson repeated this sentiment, saying, “One of the key 
                                                
66 Dr. Paul Johnson. 
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differences is the competency and mind-shifts we have to have as a health care 
organization to thinking about a population rather than thinking of people walking 
in one at a time.”67 According to Dr. Johnson, switching to a population rather 
than individual perspective is a “gigantic shift in how organizations think.”68 
The re-orientation of providers’ mindsets is to eventually take ownership 
of one or two patient populations. Hennepin Health in its own perspective shift is 
centering their program on the target population. Here that shift in perspective 
relates in some respect to the manner in which Hennepin Health receives 
compensation. Instead of receiving fee-for-services payments for individuals and 
the separate services they receive, Hennepin Health is receiving full capitation. As 
such, financial compensation from capitation, most likely, will help the 
organizations shift to creating processes geared towards the typical needs of the 
specific population. The challenge that remains though is the shift for providers 
within their individual encounters with each client, shifting from meeting one 
need at a time to a holistic-person and holistic-system orientation. 
 Program Evaluation 
 Two parts of program evaluation are giving Hennepin Health challenges 
when implementing. However, this problem does not reside within Hennepin 
Health alone, but will be issues that arise for all ACOs and new delivery system 
models with the shift to accountability compensation. Again, this is a policy 
structuring issue, but one that lies distinctly in Sabatier & Mazmanian’s fifth 
stage. As the program moves forward, Hennepin Health will need to find ways to 
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show their successes in savings – not just a shifting or shuffling between county 
departments – and how to properly value those savings. 
Valuing accountability and outcomes 
 One participant mentioned the institution of payment procedures and risk 
adjustment as a challenge. With a torrent of yet unanswered questions, the 
participant points to the uncertainty that surrounds the idea of accountability in 
conjunction with preventative care: 
On a big scale of things we need to find out how to value that kind of 
work. How do you start to figure out how to pay people for preventing 
things, to keep people healthy, to keep them out of the hospital? How do 
you properly value that? How do you know when it’s working? How do 
you know when someone didn’t have a catastrophic hospitalization? 
That’s a real challenge on the risk adjustment side to figure out what 
would have happened without proactive interventions. How do you avoid 
an emergency room visit? And how do you really know that? I think 
internally we have a good faith understanding that this is a value-based 
clinic in intervention, and the administration here is going to say that this 
is something we need to do to be cost-effective. But how are we going to 
know that for sure?69 
 
He continued by explaining the shortfalls of current measures. First for the use of 
historical data, Dr. Johnson pointed out that people’s health expectancy regresses 
to the mean. Therefore, the issue with historical data is proving that it is not 
simply regressing to the mean. Secondly, they could measure health outcomes 
from similar populations. However, the population being served by Hennepin 
Health is so specific and small that it is difficult to predict what would have 
happened with certainty or significant data. And finally, measures like patient 
satisfaction and accessibility can be used, but neither of those gets to the pointed 
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question of avoiding “next year’s catastrophe” today.70 This is one place where 
there is great potential for outside help. Possibly the state or federal government 
can be of service in developing more sophisticated risk adjustment tools. 
 Demonstrating impact within social services sector 
 The final major barrier to implementation that was mentioned within 
participants’ interviews was the ability to demonstrate impact within the social 
services sector. The actors within Hennepin Health want to avoid a cost shifting 
or trickle effect to other systems. In other words, in order to demonstrate success 
the program must show cost-neutrality at a minimum and even better, a reduction 
in costs across all the systems.  
 DeCubellis provided a recent example of cost- and problem-shifting 
within the overall system.71 She explained how patients would frequent the 
emergency room with dental pain. Some of the patients had problems getting an 
appointment at the dentist and would therefore go to the emergency room when 
the pain became unbearable. A few others had addiction issues and were seeking 
pain medication. The old protocol was to distribute pain medicine and tell the 
patient to make a dentist appointment. Now, through Hennepin Health, patients 
that arrive at the emergency room with dental pain are re-directed to the dental 
clinic. This saves the hospital and system high emergency room payments and in 
most cases, better resolves the patient’s issue. However, Hennepin Health soon 
discovered that those patients seeking pain medication began appearing in other 
emergency rooms. The challenge in this scenario now is to figure out how to 
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communicate with systems outside of Hennepin Health about changes that may 
create problem-shifts like this one, how to pull those patients back into the system 
and how to provide them with appropriate care for their condition. In the end, the 
goal is not to shift costs to other systems or other hospitals, but to directly handle 
patient problems in the most cost-effective and productive manner. 
 Conclusion 
 Many other challenges to implementing such an extensive and new 
approach to health care and social service delivery may exist, but these challenges 
were important enough to have been mentioned by the participants of this study. 
Hennepin Health faces challenges of shared governance, enrollment issues within 
a means-tested program, creating proper financial incentive and care models 
within the US health care system, and evaluating their program. In many ways, 
these challenges speak to and foreshadow the challenges that any new health care 
delivery approach – including any ACO – may face. Some of these challenges 
also overlap, pointing to the general complexity of identifying and solving the 
inherent problems involved with policy innovation and implementation and the 
collaboration of systems not typically integrated. Ultimately, however, the success 
of Hennepin Health is dependent upon overcoming these barriers. 
Relation of Hennepin Health to Implementation Frameworks 
Hennepin Health – in addition to demonstrating the challenges that health 
care delivery system reforms face – acts as a case study for policy implementation 
theory. Below is an examination of how this demonstration project fits into the 
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two implementation models previously described and as a result, how the case 
study presents the practical problems of using either model.  
Sabatier & Mazmanian 
In order to systematically study Sabatier & Mazmanian’s conceptual 
framework to implementation, this section includes how the characteristics 
involved in implementing Hennepin Health fit into the three categories stipulated 
by Sabatier & Mazmanian – tractability of the problem, ability of the statute to 
structure implementation, and nonstatutory variables affecting implementation – 
and the potential influence such characteristics have on implementation success. 
After that, the Hennepin Health case study is taken through the phases the project 
has gone through within the five-phase process. As will be seen, Sabatier & 
Mazmanian do a phenomenal job of including all of the potential characteristics 
that influence policy implementation, but such an overwhelming amount of 
characteristics brings into question which characteristics have causal effect (and 
which are simply correlated) and how much power each causal characteristic 
actually holds. The model is complex to the point of being non-functional.  
To begin, the first category that Sabatier & Mazmanian discuss is 
tractability of the problem. Without even drawing from the interviews or the 
Hennepin Health example, the literature involving ACOs and other health care 
delivery system models demonstrates the complexity of the models and the 
problems within health care that the models are attempting to address. The US 
health care system is extremely complicated and the policies that try to lower 
costs and improve health outcomes are also intricate. Furthermore, years of 
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implementing different policies and models have not corrected the problems seen 
within the US social service and health care sectors. Therefore, the problem of 
cost and quality control that ACOs attempt to correct is not very tractable.  
Additionally, Sabatier & Mazmanian enhance the tractability concept with 
the need to understand the populations involved within the policy. In the case of 
Hennepin Health, two populations are impacted by the project. First, the target 
population that the project serves is a small percentage of the overall population, 
but it is also a highly transient population that has displayed erratic behavior in 
the past. Some of the participants discussed the cause behind this population’s 
behavior relates to their constant crisis and pursuit of basic needs.72 Forums were 
held with the target population in order to better understand how, where and why 
they seek health services, as well as their ideals for receiving these services.73 
After identification of causes for behavior and the forums to determine the 
population’s views, the patients’ behavior may be slightly more predictable, but 
ultimately still adds a layer of complexity to the problem. The second population 
is the providers within the demonstration project. Their behaviors are driven by 
incentives, and getting the incentive formula correct to manipulate provider 
behavior within the health care system is difficult. This case study has the same 
problem with provider behavior – incentivizing quality over quantity. For these 
reasons, Hennepin Health’s relation to Sabatier & Mazmanian’s first category of 
policy characteristics suggests that Hennepin Health will struggle to successfully 
reach its goals. The population and its behavior is not easily managed and 
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modified, not because Medicaid patients do not want to change their behavior, but 
because of the complexity of their life and financial situations. 
The second category is the ability of a statute to structure implementation, 
which primarily includes a statute’s ability to link the problem with a solution by 
specifying clear, explicit, precise, measurable and realizable objectives. This 
requires the statute to establish a valid causal relationship, acknowledge and 
distribute necessary resources, provide incentives for compliance (and conversely 
sanctions for non-compliance), and regulate the number of clearance points. 
Applying Hennepin Health to these prescribed characteristics again shows 
difficulties for a successful demonstration project. Firstly, Hennepin Health is 
required to adhere to a rigorous evaluation and measurement process, which 
shows that the demonstration project has created explicit objectives and put in 
place a manner in which to measure progress and accomplishment of those 
objectives. However, as suggested from the challenges section, program 
evaluation still faces certain barriers, particularly demonstrating improvements 
across all sectors integrated into the program.74 As Ross Owen, Manager of Care 
Delivery Reform at Minnesota’s Department of Human Services, explained, 
“[Hennepin Health] could do a great job with saving dollars within the county 
system in the housing sector, but if it causes a spike in health care costs, it won’t 
necessarily look like a success in Medicaid costs.”75 In other words, 
demonstrating success across all the entities involved will be difficult. So even if 
the projects objectives are clear, the question remains if they are realizable. The 
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project does draw causal lines between the health care and social service sectors. 
Program advocates believe a patient’s health outcomes are related to their housing 
and financial situation and have thus shaped the project around this relationship. 
The next portion of this category involves resources. As the project’s 
integration of health care and social services is a new and unique concept within 
the US, knowledge and experience as a resource is lacking. However, the actors 
involved in Hennepin Health have other programs from which to draw 
experience, including the Preferred Integrated Network (PINS),76 HCMC’s 
Positive Care Center,77 and the Coordinated Care Clinic devised through the 
Coordinated Care Delivery System (CCDS).78 Hennepin Health received a block 
grant as part of their contract, but whether that amount will be sufficient to care 
                                                
76 PINS was developed in 2008 in response to the state’s request for proposals to create 
an “integrated network for persons with co-occurring mental health and medical 
needs” (“Integrated Health Delivery Network: A Social Disparities Approach to 
Health & Health Care,” p. 20). Hennepin County submitted the PINS proposal to the 
Minnesota Department of Human Services, but it was never approved or 
implemented. There is some overlap of the population of PINS and Hennepin 
Health’s recipients. Therefore, information gathered during the PINS planning 
process was informative in the development of Hennepin Health’s protocols and care 
model (“Integrated Health Delivery Network: A Social Disparities Approach to 
Health & Health Care,” p. 23). 
77 HCMC’s own Positive Care Center has presented a wealth of similarities for which to 
brainstorm solutions and stands as a successful example of care models with 
integrated health and other services. The Positive Care Center is designed 
specifically for patients who are HIV positive to provide them with comprehensive 
health and psychosocial services. 
78 CCDS was a block grant (capitation) program in which four metro-area hospitals 
participated. These four hospitals, including HCMC, accepted a capitation payment 
in return of caring for and being financially responsible for a particular patient 
population. Through the CCDS capitation payment, HCMC developed its 
Coordinated Care Clinic with part of the CCDS capitation funding. They targeted the 
most expensive CCDS patients, the high-utilizers of the emergency department and 
hospital system. Patients were re-routed from the emergency department to the 
Coordinated Care Clinic, where their care was more closely managed and they could 
get their social service needs met. Through enrollment in the Coordinated Care 
Clinic, HCMC’s most expensive and highest-using patients experienced a 42 percent 
decrease in repeat hospitalizations and a 38 percent decrease in emergency 
department visits (“Integrated Health Delivery Network: A Social Disparities 
Approach to Health & Health Care,” p. 21). 
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for all of this population’s needs or not is unknown. Yet, the premise of the 
project is to be able to create a system that ultimately operates on that budget or 
less. Concerning technological resources, those involved believe in the 
capabilities of the data warehouse they are building, but as was stated in the 
challenges section, there are issues with the legal capacity to share information 
among the partners.79 The political support behind the project is strong with the 
County Administrator and county board committed to health care reform. 
However, if such support continues as political figures change over is also 
unknown. So in terms of resources, Hennepin Health would appear to have 
several resources at their disposal – experience from previous programs, financial 
and technological resources, and political support, but the lack of knowledge or 
experience for implementing this specific of a program and the struggles with 
information sharing due to a lack of legal capacity may inhibit success. This 
particular lack of resources is a challenge inherent to ACOs in general. 
Additionally, Sabatier & Mazmanian discuss the number of veto or 
clearance points as a characteristic that impacts implementation. Within this 
project, Hennepin Health has four partners, but a vast number of providers with 
whom they contract. The sheer amount of relationships and collaboration 
expected and involved within this model adds to the difficulty of successful 
implementation. 
The third category is nonstatutory variables, which includes media 
attention, public support, time, changes in social, economic, political and 
technological conditions, and bargaining. In the case of Hennepin Health, the 
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latter three play a role in Hennepin Health’s formation and implementation and 
have the potential to be beneficial or inhibitory of the project’s success. Hennepin 
Health was formed quickly, which in some respects, was the reasoning behind 
some of the conditions of the negotiated contract with the Minnesota Department 
of Human Services.80 So time played a factor in the way negotiations and 
contracts took shape, but whether the speed in which the project was formed and 
organized factors into the success is not known. Changes in economic conditions 
with the US recession had some role in the inception of Hennepin Health. 
DeCubellis points out that the county needed to find a way to stretch their dollar 
further with more people seeking services and a smaller tax base to provide those 
services.81 Other social, political and technological condition changes – such as 
the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the atmosphere 
of health care policy reform that it created – may have influenced the project as 
well, but the weight of that influence is difficult, if not impossible to determine.  
And finally, bargaining played a significant role in the policy of this 
demonstration project. First of all, negotiations and bargaining were the primary 
mechanism by which contracts were developed among the four partners and 
between the county and the state entities involved. Secondly, more than one 
participant explained that the Hennepin Health project is not regulated under 
Section 19. After Minnesota’s Department of Human Services created guidelines 
for demonstration projects under Section 19 legislation, Hennepin County realized 
they were moving in a different direction in terms of what the demonstration 
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project should look like and what population they wanted to serve. Through 
conversations with the department, Hennepin County was allowed and 
encouraged to continue with their project, but it would operate under a different 
contract than one developed through Section 19. 
As seen from the last few pages, Sabatier & Mazmanian accurately 
identified several characteristics that can influence policy development and 
implementation, and many of those factors had roles in the creation and 
implementation of Hennepin Health. However, the weight that each of these 
characteristics have in the formula that drive successful implementation is 
unknown. Therefore, the composition of characteristics has no predictive 
capability. In the end, Sabatier & Mazmanian’s model is useful in a conceptual or 
theoretical sense in regards to the characteristics that can impact implementation, 
but theoretically fails to adequately describe the overall process of 
implementation.  
Majone & Wildavsky 
Majone & Wildavsky take a completely different approach to their model. 
They attempt to look at policy implementation holistically through their 
implementation as evolution model. The holistic approach makes examination 
from a case study extremely difficult, particularly a case study that has only 
recently been implemented and has not yet gathered evaluative data on its overall 
success. Looking at the case study of Hennepin Health, this study confirms 
Majone & Wildavsky’s assertion that their first two models – implementation as 
control and implementation as interaction – fail as theories of implementation. For 
86 
 
the first model, control does not work in the case of Hennepin Health because 
Hennepin Health does not fall under Section 19; Hennepin County chose a 
different route for their demonstration project and DHS allowed them to do so. 
This might point to some level of truth to the implementation as interaction model 
– Hennepin County and the partners of Hennepin Health ‘interacted’ with DHS in 
order to develop the demonstration project and implement it. However, this model 
does not take into consideration the federal regulations that impacted the 
demonstration project’s ability to form and move forward and the evolution of 
health care policy models from which the project drew its parameters. 
So what conclusions can be draw about Majone & Wildavsky’s third 
model – implementation as evolution – from the Hennepin Health case study? 
First, it shows that policies are “potentialities.” Section 20, the Minnesota statute 
that allowed Hennepin County to develop a demonstration project such as this, 
was a potentiality until the project was formed and implemented.  
Second, implementation does rely on both intrinsic qualities and external 
circumstances. Intrinsic qualities are the ways in which policy is written to 
structure implementation, and external circumstances are societal conditions and 
the actions of agencies and actors that are implementing the policy that influence 
overall implementation. These intrinsic qualities and external circumstances are 
not delineated by Majone & Wildavsky, but it is possible to assume that the 
characteristic groups and their components that Sabatier & Mazmanian outline – 
tractability of the problem, ability of the statute to structure implementation and 
nonstatutory factors – could be reorganized under Majone and Wildavksy’s two 
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groups. As such, the characteristics of the Hennepin Health project that may 
impact implementation was already discussed under the Sabatier & Mazmanian 
section and point to the accuracy of Majone & Wildavsky’s statement. 
And finally, Majone & Wildavsky believe that implementation is in a 
constant state of change with the end policy and its implementation being 
“genetically related” to the original policy idea. Operating under their holistic 
viewpoint, no conclusion can yet be drawn because the demonstration project has 
not yet reached its evaluation and ending stage. But, looking at the literature, it 
appears that these health care delivery system demonstrations are evolving from a 
history of health care policy reforms – medical home models, HMOs, etc. – and at 
their core, are attempting to address the same problems of cost and quality. In 
conclusion, Majone & Wildavsky’s model also fails to be practical and predictive. 
It – like Sabatier & Mazmanian’s model – is highly theoretical, begging the 
question then if a predictive implementation model can be developed. 
Implications 
 Implications for the study of policy implementation 
 The implication of this case for the study of policy implementation is 
simple: a predictive and practical policy implementation model has not yet been 
produced and in reality, may never be produced. Implementation is an extremely 
complex process and is even further complicated when it attempts to address 
convoluted societal issues, such as health care and social services. Sabatier & 
Mazmanian’s work on the characteristics that affect implementation is as close to 
a practical framework as any research has yet gotten. However, perhaps the goals 
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of the two models are different from each other and neither explicitly aims to 
predict implementation success. With their model, Sabatier & Mazmanian may be 
attempting to give researchers a better, more cohesive manner with which to study 
and talk about policy implementation. By giving a full spectrum of characteristics 
that may be causal variables in implementation, Sabatier & Mazmanian are giving 
a preview to the possible challenges, to what could go awry. Majone & 
Wildavsky, on the other hand, likely had a different goal for their model. They 
perhaps intended to provide language for describing how the process of 
implementation unfolds in its totality. Still, researchers may want to develop 
better and more rigorous ways to examine how the separate characteristics impact 
implementation. Answers to the following questions are areas of study to further 
develop: Which characteristics are causal and which are correlative? What 
amount or weight should each characteristic be given? And how do the 
characteristics change based on the type of policy being implemented (i.e. health 
care policy, welfare policy, etc.)? 
 Effect on future health care and social service policy 
The unique features of Hennepin Health – regardless of whether the 
project successfully reduces costs alongside improved health outcomes – have the 
potential to drive state and federal health care legislation. But if Hennepin Health 
is successful, this demonstration project could serve as a prominent model for 
future health care reforms. The program’s unique features include the population 
served, the inclusion of social services within the care model, the ability to track 
recipients through the data warehouse, and the motivation as a county safety net. 
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First, as previously stated, ACO models currently implemented across the United 
States are for Medicare populations. Hennepin Health, on the other hand, is 
choosing to target a Medicaid population frequently overlooked. Yet this 
population is comprised of some of the highest utilizers of the health care and 
social service sectors, cost the system the most money, and have a lifespan 
significantly shortened by chronic disease and mental illness.82 As such, this 
demonstration project will give insight on how to best serve this particular 
population and perhaps lower costs of serving this population. 
The second – and most prominent – characteristic that this study’s 
participants mentioned was the inclusion of social services within the health care 
delivery model. All of the participants mentioned the social disparity concept – 
rolling housing, corrections and other county operations into the fold – as the 
main feature of Hennepin Health. Dr. Larsen stated that the initiative to find the 
total cost of individuals for a county was rare,83 and they believe they can save 
money and produce better results in the end by treating patients “holistically.”84 
DeCubellis cites the prioritization of basic needs as an instigator to some failures 
of health care: 
For example, hypertension is their concern. Then how many times we tell 
a person to take this pill and how many times it’s important to check their 
blood pressure regularly if they don’t know where their next meal is 
coming from, if they don’t know where they’re sleeping that night, no 
matter how much we educate, that’s not their priority. Their basic needs 
are their priority at that moment. So the project is front-loading those 
services. We believe we can use the medical dollars to cover basic needs 
and get better health outcomes and still reduce the overall cost by making 
sure that we address those needs prior to the crisis event occurring… 
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We’re engaging those individuals in preventive care, making sure they’re 
seeing someone in primary care. We’re making sure those services are 
available in the shelters, available in the community. And that if someone 
does come in to us – for example with pain in their arm, we’re not just 
looking at their arm; we’re looking at their entire situation. What are their 
needs? And making sure we address them holistically so that we’re not 
just working with a part of their body. We’re making sure that they really 
have the ability to follow through with our suggestions based on their life 
status.85 
 
Recognizing that these patients have more pressing concerns that their health, 
until their health becomes a crisis, is an important element and will, in theory, 
help Hennepin County to either reduce costs or redistribute resources to create 
better overall value of services. Owen considers this feature to be one of the 
greatest challenges, but also one of the greatest opportunities.86 If Hennepin 
Health is able to demonstrate savings (or at least cost neutrality with improved 
value) across all their county sectors, this will have huge implications on how to 
break down the silos built within social policy in general. Because of the intimate 
connection between social and health care services, demonstrating how the two 
systems can work together has the potential to change how all local governments 
administer and govern these services. 
To make social services part of the model, it is also essential to make them 
part of the patient’s electronic health record.87 Hennepin Health does this within 
their data warehouse. Having all of the information in one location not only 
allows for better coordination for the individuals, but allows for better evaluation 
of the program overall. The county will be able to draw out data from the 
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warehouse to examine and prove if the model reduces costs in the public sector 
over a long period of time. They want to avoid cost shifting. As DeCubellis states: 
We also argue we have a unique position because we want to make sure 
there is no cost shifting… We can get our arms around are we shifting 
costs to the courts, to the jails, to the city hospital, to the public sector… 
So we are following people to say, ‘What is the impact here if we provide 
some upfront basic needs and social services? Can we keep them out of 
the jail? Can we reduce court costs? Can we make sure they don’t end up 
in long term care or state hospital programs or other state operated 
services?’ We just have a little broader view and some motivations around 
keeping people well and out of the public sector in requiring those 
supports.88 
 
Unlike most private models, Hennepin Health will be able to examine their 
impact across all of the public entities to find the true total cost of care results. 
Total cost of care models in the public sector, if successful, will have great 
influence in how local government programs are run. 
 And finally, Hennepin County is motivated as the public entity, the county 
safety net, to reduce overall costs and produce better value for their services. 
Unlike private models, the county will be required to provide services, in one way 
or another, even if the patient loses their state or federal benefits.89 For this 
reason, Hennepin County is even more motivated to make this demonstration 
project successful. 
 If Hennepin Health proves successful, expansion and replication was cited 
by six of the study’s participants as the next logical step.90 There are hopes to 
expand the model to other populations; a couple mentioned dual-eligibles91 as the 
next population to be incorporated into the model. Expansion to other counties 
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and states was also mentioned. The flip side of expansion involves keeping 
‘successful’ patients engaged in the model. Once a patient is no longer considered 
a high-user and/or Medicaid recipient, it will be important not to kick them out of 
a care delivery model that worked for them. As such, bringing in private 
insurance companies and private providers will be vital in keeping people 
engaged in the model.92 The role of and relationships among health insurers, 
providers, managed care organizations and delivery systems is evolving, and 
demonstration projects like Hennepin Health are going to have an enormous 
impact on the direction health care policy – and now social service policy – takes. 
 At the time this study was written, the US Supreme Court was in the midst 
of hearing several cases arguing against the constitutionality of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act and would be announcing a decision in June 
2012. The logical question that arises concerning this particular study is: how will 
the decision impact Hennepin Health and other ACO demonstration projects? If 
the act is repealed, will ACOs be able to move forward in implementation and 
expansion? A small minority of analysts believes that a decision to repeal the act 
would stop – or at least significantly inhibit – the implementation of ACOs. Since 
part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is to fund advanced health 
information technology and since ACOs rely so heavily on that technology, ACO 
models would be severely limited. In other words, the model will still be around, 
but resources including funding and organizational support may not be available 
                                                
92 DeCubellis. 
93 
 
to implement it.93 Many more, however, argue that as more and more ACO and 
ACO-like models are implemented, the Supreme Court’s decision will not be able 
to stop their spread.94 “[The implementation of ACOs] is going to continue,” 
according to one analyst, “because there are other market imperatives forcing 
improvements in quality and efficiency of care.”95 As long as there is pressure 
within the system to improve quality and lower costs, new integrated care models 
will evolve and be implemented, which means that the Hennepin Health model 
may have enormous implications for the health care system regardless of any 
legislation or judicial decision. 
Study Limitations 
This methodology has certain limitations. First off, due to time constraints 
and the inherent nature of the case study I have selected some of the 
characteristics that Majone & Wildavsky and Sabatier & Mazmanian mention as 
important for determining the level of successful implementation will not be 
addressed. For example, “the amount and continuity of media attention to the 
problem addressed by a statute” 96 was not scrutinized thoroughly within this 
paper. To remain true to the specificity and locality of the case study being 
examined, only media attention concerning Hennepin County’s demonstration 
project should be studied. While the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
as a whole and ACOs as general models have received considerable amounts of 
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media attention, the media attention surrounding the demonstration project is 
either not substantial or sufficient enough and would require vast amounts of time 
and energy to find and dissect. Therefore, this characteristic from Sabatier & 
Mazmanian’s framework will not be considered in the discussion. 
Following from that limitation is the constraint of rigor from using one 
case study and from the volume and complexity of characteristics involved in 
examining the implementation of a health care delivery system demonstration 
project. Using a case study allows for a more in-depth look at a new health care 
delivery model, but it sacrifices a level of statistical or replicable certainty. Also 
the sheer amount of characteristics that impact implementation and the fact that 
most of these characteristics are complex or nuanced makes it almost impossible 
to determine which characteristics are causal, correlative or not related to the 
success of implementation. 
The third limitation – and most inhibiting limitation – is the inability to 
study the final implementation results of the demonstration project as the launch 
date was January 1, 2012, giving insufficient time to collect accurate data on 
success of the project. However, in all of the interviews conducted, participants 
were asked questions pertaining to the projected success rates of the project, 
likely challenges to successful implementation, and perceived impacts of the 
project on policy. The inability to examine the end results is probably the most 
detrimental limitation to the study because it is the observation of implementation 
success or failure that provides the most evidence for aspects of both models. This 
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is an area where implementation literature and theory can converge, and to not be 
in a position to examine how these two pieces fit together is a severe limitation. 
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Conclusion 
Americans are at a pivotal moment in terms of creating a better health care 
system, one with lower costs and better health outcomes. Reform is in the air, and 
with a movement towards establishing more integrated health care delivery 
systems; the potential for improved value exists. Yet, as this study suggests, 
inherent challenges are present within the health care system and overall political 
and administrative structures that act as significant barriers to reform and 
successful completion of generating better value. ACOs and similar health care 
delivery system models are complex care and payment models. Due to 
uncertainties about their implementation – including a lack of understanding of 
the ACO definition, a lack of provider and payer experience, unclear legal and 
financial ramifications and in general, fear of their influence on regulation and 
low patient participation – such models are being introduced to the system 
through demonstration projects. Hennepin Health in Minnesota is one of those 
demonstration projects. 
 Hennepin Health, as an integrated health care delivery system 
demonstration project, works to integrate health care and social services at the 
county level for a target population of single adults without children who live at 
or below 75 percent of the federal poverty line. Using a full capitation payment 
method from the state in conjunction with a shared risk agreement, Hennepin 
Health’s partners have entered new territory concerning collaboration across 
government entities. Actors within the project who participated in this study 
articulated the challenges as problems of shared governance, means-tested 
97 
 
programs, US health care culture, and program evaluation. They are worried 
about how to enact complicated contacts among the partners and between the state 
and county at the local level; they are concerned about obtaining and retaining a 
critical mass patient population. They are struggling with out-dated legal 
regulations for patient privacy and information sharing, and they are apprehensive 
about their ability to demonstrate savings and improved outcomes across all the 
systems in which they are working. Some of these challenges were predicted by 
the ACO literature and others – particularly shared governance among the three 
levels of government – are perpetual challenges of implementing US health care 
and social policy. 
 When placed against theories of policy implementation, the theories 
cannot predict Hennepin Health’s chances at success. Sabatier & Mazmanian’s 
conceptual framework helps to delineate the characteristics that may factor into 
successful implementation. In this sense, policy creators, administrators and 
street-level bureaucrats are given a preview of the challenges they may face and 
the factors they need to consider when creating and implementing policy. 
However, the model fails to give insight as to which characteristics are most 
important, the ones that have the most influence on implementation. The inability 
to create a formulaic implementation model is likely due to the intricacies of the 
US political system and the complexity of health care and other social policy, as 
well as the problems they attempt to address. 
 For now, it is a waiting game for Hennepin Health. If the project is 
successful, there are significant implications for the future integration of health 
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care and social services, as well as ACO and ACO-like models. Counties and 
states may begin addressing populations holistically, trying to juggle housing, 
corrections, health care, and much more in one program or project rather than 
across separate governmental entities. Furthermore, the particular population that 
Hennepin Health has chosen to target is a highly transient and expensive 
population. If Hennepin Health can improve health outcomes and reduce costs 
simultaneously for this population, then the project has vast potential for 
replication to other geographic areas and with other populations. 
 Historically, sweeping health care reforms – like patient-centered medical 
homes, HMOs and managed care plans – have failed to produce desired results. 
They have been unable to reduce (or even stabilize) health care costs while 
simultaneously improving health outcomes. ACOs and recent health care delivery 
models have the potential to meet that dual goal, and to reiterate Crosson’s claim, 
we are at a moment when they are too important to fail.  
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